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Abstract
We estimate a dynamic model of employment, human capital accumulation - including ed-
ucation, and savings for women in the UK, exploiting tax and benefit reforms, and use it
to analyze the effects of welfare policy. We find substantial elasticities for labor supply and
particularly for lone mothers. Returns to experience, which are important in determining
the longer-term effects of policy, increase with education, but experience mainly accumulates
when in full-time employment. Tax credits are welfare improving in the UK and increase
lone-mother labor supply, but the employment effects do not extend beyond the period of el-
igibility. Marginal increases in tax credits improve welfare more than equally costly increases
in income support or tax cuts.
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1 Introduction
The UK, the US and many other countries have put in place welfare programs subsidizing the wages
of low-earning individuals and especially lone mothers, alongside other income support measures.
Such programs can have multiple effects on careers and social welfare: on the one hand, they
change the incentives to obtain education, to work and to accumulate human capital and savings;
and on the other hand, they offer potentially valuable (partial) insurance against labor-market
shocks. We develop an empirical framework for education, life-cycle labor supply and savings that
allows us to study the longer-term behavioral and welfare effects of such programs.1
Our focus in this paper is on how such benefits affect the careers of women. As mothers they are
the main target group of these welfare programs and are most responsive to incentives.2 A sizable
proportion of them become single mothers at some point in their lives, have low labor market
attachment and are vulnerable to poverty (see Blundell and Hoynes, 2004, for example). Indeed,
a motivation for in-work benefits is to preserve the labor-market attachment of lower-skill mothers
and to prevent skill depreciation, which may underlie longer-term poverty.3
With the notable exception of Keane and Wolpin (2007, 2010) earlier work has focussed mostly on
the short-term effects of in-work benefits on labor supply,4 which are central to the optimal design
of such benefits as shown by Saez (2002). However, this is not the whole story, because welfare
benefits can affect the returns to education, the accumulation of human capital through experience
as well as savings both because of their wealth effects and because they affect the extent to which
people are insured against shocks; all these may change labour supply in the longer term. Thus we
extend the literature and consider how welfare benefits and taxes affect careers of women through
these various channels, beyond the period-by-period changes in employment.
1Throughout the paper we use interchangeably the terms “benefits”, “subsidies”, “transfers”, “welfare” and
“welfare programs” to denote government transfers to lower-income individuals.
2See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Meghir and Phillips (2012) for surveys of the evidence.
3See Goldin (2006 and 2014), Shaw (1989), Imai and Keane (2004) and Heckman, Lochner and Cossa (2003).
4Eissa and Liebman (1996) estimate the impact of EITC on female labor supply; Hotz and Scholz (2003) review
the literature on the effects of the US Earned Income Tax Credit; Card and Robins (2005) and Card and Hyslop
(2005) assess the effects of the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project on employment and wages; Blundell and Hoynes
(2004), Brewer et al. (2006) and Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007) assess the employment effects of the UK’s
Working Families’ Tax Credit reform of 1999.
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We study the UK tax and welfare system, which saw numerous reforms over the 1990s and 2000s,
with major increases to in-work benefits, or tax credits, between 1999 and 2002. We thus start our
analysis by examining how these reforms affected the short-run labor supply of lone mothers and
the educational decisions of young women. Using a quasi-experimental framework, we verify that
the reforms increased lone mother labor supply and reduced educational attainment, as expected.
Following this reduced form analysis, we estimate a dynamic life-cycle model of female education
choice, labor supply, wages and consumption/savings over the life-cycle, which is capable of ad-
dressing the longer-term effects of policy. Our data is drawn from 18 annual waves of the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) covering the years 1991 to 2008. We combine these data with
a tax and benefit simulation model to construct the household budget constraint in all its detail,
incorporating taxes and the welfare system and the way it has changed over time.
In the model, at the start of their life-cycle, women choose between three possible education
levels (secondary, high school and university), taking into account the implied costs as well as
the expected returns and volatility associated with each choice, both of which are affected by
taxes and benefits. Once education is completed they make period-by-period employment and
savings decisions depending on wages, preferences and family structure, which evolves over the
life-cycle. Importantly, wages are determined by education and experience, which accumulates or
depreciates depending on whether individuals work full-time, part-time or not at all. While male
income, fertility and marriage are exogenous, they are driven by stochastic processes that depend
on education and age. In this sense our results are conditional on the observed status quo process
of family formation, which differs by education.
The policy reforms, are an important source of exogenous variation, which we use to estimate our
dynamic model and to validate that it can replicate the effects we estimate quasi-experimentally.
Over our 18-year observation period, new cohorts enter adulthood facing different tax and welfare
systems, which changes the expected value of each education choice. Moreover reforms take place
over their life-cycle at different ages, differentially affecting their returns to work. Individuals are
ex-ante heterogeneous because of differing family background, which can affect their preferences,
wages, costs of education and responses to tax and benefit changes. The interaction between
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the reforms and the observable individual type thus provides exogenous variation that we use in
the estimation of the dynamic model. To help explain education choice we also use a parental
liquidity shock when the woman was 16, net of the effects of any observable family background
characteristics.
Our paper addresses a number of important research questions. First, we study the effects of
incentives on the labor supply of women and produce Marshallian and Frisch elasticities for various
demographic groups. Second, we look at how individuals make decisions on education and, more
generally, at how human capital evolves over the lifecycle depending on the interaction between
education, employment and working hours. Third, by developing a framework that can explain
the labor supply and education responses to incentives and their long-term effects for earnings
capacity and savings, we also contribute to the understanding of the broader impact of taxes and
welfare benefits and their role in redistribution, insurance and incentives. Within this context,
our model and empirical results are directly relevant for the design of optimal income tax and
human capital policies that balance incentives and insurance, as developed by Stantcheva (2015).
We find moderate labor supply elasticities overall: the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 0.63 on
the extensive (participation) margin and 0.24 on the intensive one (part-time versus full-time).
The elasticities are substantially higher for single mothers with secondary education only, who are
the main target group of the tax credit program.5 Relatively large estimated income effects lead
to lower Marshallian elasticities.
Our results display large and significant returns to labor-market experience for full-time work,
especially for women who completed a 3-year university degree or more. Part-time work does not
contribute to human capital growth, but does attenuate the depreciation of skills relative to not
working. Those with secondary education earn little or no returns to experience. The differences
in the accumulation of experience between part-time and full time work and the complementarity
with education are central to understanding the longer term effects of tax credits.
Using the model, we find that tax credits increase the labor supply of lone mothers, but decrease
5Our elasticities are somewhat lower than those estimated by Keane and Wolpin (2010) but exhibit similar
variation with education and family demographics.
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that of married mothers.6 Most lone mothers are so for a limited period, being married at some
other earlier stage of their child-rearing life. This, combined with the fact that the UK tax credit
system encourages part-time work at the expense of full-time, leads to an average zero net effect
on accumulated experience. The resulting employment rates among mothers of adult children are
the same as they would have been in the absence of tax credits. However, tax credits are overall
welfare improving. Finally, we consider the implications of assessing tax credits at the individual
rather than at the family level, making it part of the single-filing tax system in the UK. The effect
of this reform on the savings, experience accumulation and wages of mothers of young children is
sufficiently strong to lead to a decline in employment (relative to the system of joint assessment)
once eligibility ceases because children have grown. It is also an expensive reform that increases
taxation substantially and is overall welfare reducing.
Our paper builds on a long history of dynamic life-cycle models.7 However, the closest model
to ours is that developed in Keane and Wolpin (2007, 2010 - KW). These papers use NLSY
data to estimate a dynamic model of schooling and human capital accumulation (through work
experience), labor supply, fertility, marriage and welfare participation and to analyze the effects of
welfare on these outcomes in the US economy. Instead, we look at the UK case, where the welfare
system is more generous and entitlement to benefits spreads higher in the income distribution
than in the US. Moreover, we focus on a period of critical expansion of welfare for families that
significantly changed the working incentives of mothers and, potentially, the value of education
for women. This variation is used in estimating our model.
A key distinguishing feature of our model to those of KW is that we allow for savings, a central
ingredient given the motivation of our paper. We focus on savings because assets are the main
channel for (self) insurance in an economy with incomplete insurance and credit markets. They
6The data does not distinguish between married and cohabiting individuals and neither does the welfare system.
We use “married” as a shorthand for someone living with a partner.
7Our model is related to Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) who developed the life-cycle model of female labor
supply, to Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) who introduced a dynamic discrete choice model of labor supply, wages and
fertility, to Keane and Wolpin (1997) who estimate a dynamic model of education, occupational choice and labor
supply for men as well as to Lee (2005), Adda et al. (2013) again for men and to Shaw (1989), Heckman, Lochner
and Taber (1998) and Imai and Keane (2004) who consider lifecycle models of labor supply and consumption with
human capital accumulation. It also relates to the life-cycle consistent models of labor supply and consumption
developed by MaCurdy (1983), Altonji (1986), Blundell and Walker (1986), Arellano and Meghir (1992), Blundell,
Meghir and Neves (1993) and Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998).
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will be sensitive to the risk profile associated to each level of education and will also be affected by
the structure and generosity of the welfare programs. Our study relates to the entire population
- not just a very low skill and poor subgroup - and hence asset accumulation is an important
feature of the lifecycle. Indeed we document that holding assets is to varying degrees relevant for
all education groups, particularly once we account for housing. Counterfactual simulations that
change public insurance programs would give an incomplete picture of the welfare effects if they
did not allow individuals to change their savings behavior because they would ignore the change
in insurance value and give a distorted view of behavior. Moreover, the fit of many aspects of the
model worsens substantially when we ignore assets.
A simplification with respect to KW is the way we treat fertility and marriage. While they
allow these to be fully endogenous, we condition on the observed processes when carrying out
counterfactual analysis.8 A more complete treatment of this interesting issue is left for future
research because of the formidable computational demands that it entails.
We begin with a description of the tax and welfare systems in section 2. Section 3 describes the
data and the quasi-experimental results. Section 4 describes the model and section 5 estimation.
Section 6 presents the estimated parameters. The model fit, and its implications are discussed in
section 7 while section 8 discusses counterfactual analysis. Section 9 concludes.
2 Tax and Welfare Policy in the UK
The UK personal tax and transfer system comprises a small number of simple taxes (mostly
levied at the individual level), and a set of welfare benefits and tax credits (usually means-tested
at the family level). Over the period of our data, which extends from 1991 to 2008, there have
been numerous reforms. Tables 1 and 2 summarize some of the key parameters of the system
at four critical points in time. For computational economy, the model we estimate will assume
8Beyond the differences in savings and in the treatment of family formation, the studies have many other differ-
ences. For example, we use a detailed description of the personal taxes and benefits operating in our observation
window to obtain a realistic representation of the work incentives faced by women and how they change over time.
Our identification strategy also differs from that adopted in Keane and Wolpin (2010) because we use the policy
variation induced by the reforms to estimate the model.
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that individuals face these four systems, ignoring smaller reforms in periods in between. However,
some reforms did take place at times in between, particularly over the 1999 to 2002 period. This
is important for our reduced form analysis.9 Appendix F provides more detail.10
Table 1: Working Tax Credit and Income Support under different tax and transfer systems - lone
mothers and mothers with low-wage partners working full-time; 1 child families
Lone mother Mother in couple
Partner working full-time
1995 1999 2002 2004 1995 1999 2002 2004
Income Support
(1) Maximum award 109.7 108.6 122.0 62.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(2) Withdrawal rate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Tax Credits
Maximum awards
(3) Work contingent component, no CC costs 93.6 96.5 117.1 115.7 43.9 43.2 74.9 47.0
(4) Work contingent component with CC costs 93.6 96.5 186.3 184.9 83.3 96.5 147.7 119.8
(5) Not work contingent component 0.0 0.0 0.0 47.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 47.2
(6) Withdrawal rate 70% 70% 55% 37% 70% 70% 55% 37%
Female earnings at which tax credit award is exhausted
(7) no childcare costs 298.2 294.2 402.0 1255.5 61.7 60.8 142.3 1052.1
(8) with childcare cost 384.9 407.9 596.7 1255.5 131.9 148.6 335.6 1052.1
Notes: Tax and benefit systems as in April each year. CC: Child care. Figures for mothers in couples assume partner works
full-time at the April 2004 minimum wage. Work requirement is 16 hours per week for 1 adult (rows 3 and 4) or all adults for CC
component (difference between rows 4 and 3). Monetary amounts expressed in £ and in weekly terms, uprated to January 2008
prices using RPI. Detailed notes in Appendix F, Table 33.
Income Support (IS) and tax credits are the two key elements of the UK benefit system over
this period. Table 1 shows changes in the the awards, taper rates11 and eligibility faced by lone
mothers and mothers in couples with a full-time working partner on the minimum wage.
IS is a benefit for families and acts as an income top up, causing an implicit marginal tax rate of
100%. It depends on family circumstances – number of children and adults and their ages. Between
April 1999 and April 2002, there was a big increase in the generosity of the child additions for
younger children, which were later removed and partly relabelled as the non-work contingent part
of tax credits, called Child Tax Credits (rows 1 and 5 in Table 1). The increase in the IS award
between 1999 to 2002 was gradually implemented annually (row 1).12 Couples where at least one
9In estimation, the 1995 system covers the period up to 1996; the 1999 system covers 1997 to 1999; the 2002
system covers 2000 to 2002 and the 2004 system covers 2003 to 2008.
10For a comprehensive discussion of UK taxes and transfers, see Browne and Roantree (2012) and Browne and
Hood (2012).
11These are the rates of benefit withdrawal as family earned income increases and lead to implicit tax rates on
earnings.
12In real terms, the maximum subsidy increased from £108.58 in 1999 to £114.77, £119.99 and £122.04 in 2000,
2001 and 2002, respectively.
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Table 2: Tax rates and thresholds under different tax and transfer systems
1995 1999 2002 2004
Income Tax: thresholds
Personal allowance 95.5 105.9 106.0 103.1
Starting rate upper limit 182.1 142.5 150.1 147.0
Basic rate upper limit 753.4 789.7 792.6 785.3
Income Tax: rates
Starting rate 20% 10% 10% 10%
Basic rate 25% 23% 22% 22%
Higher rate 40% 40% 40% 40%
National Insurance: thresholds
Lower earnings limit (LEL) 81.67 83.82 106.27 102.81
Upper earnings limit (UEL) 619.54 634.99 698.54 689.17
National Insurance: rates
Entry fee (up to LEL) 2% 0% 0% 0%
Main rate (earnings in LEL-UEL region) 10% 10% 10% 11%
Rate above UEL 0% 0% 0% 1%
Notes: Amounts expressed in weekly terms and uprated to January 2008 prices using RPI. Allowance for couples is the married
couple allowance and additional personal allowance. Tax and benefits systems as in April each year.
of the partners works full-time at the minimum wage are not entitled to IS as their income exceeds
the upper limit for entitlement.
Tax credits are a means tested benefit for working families with children similar to the US Earned
Income tax credit. Entitlement is conditional on working except for the Child Tax Credits com-
ponent mentioned above. Eligibility to the work contingent component requires at least one adult
working 16 or more hours a week and at least one dependent child. Furthermore, eligibility to
childcare support (difference between rows 3 to 4 in Table 1) in couples requires both adults work-
ing at least 16 hours per week. Eligibility to an additional supplement occurs at 30 hours of work.
In 2004, entitlement to tax credits was extended to working families without children but at much
lower level of generosity.
Rows 3 and 4 in the Table 1 show the increase in work-contingent maximum awards over the period
for families with a single dependent child and no or positive childcare expenses, respectively.13
Over the 1999-2002 period, the maximum award increased continuously. For lone mothers with
no childcare costs, it went from £96.52 in 1999 to £105.64, £110.84 and £117.14 in 2000, 2001
and 2002, respectively. At the same time, the rate at which the benefits are tapered away dropped
13Childcare expenses calculated for 40 hours per week at £2.60 per hour.
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significantly (row 6), which implied that eligibility was extended to new better-off families (rows
7 and 8). By 2004, eligibility for a newly introduced family component of the Tax Credits was
maintained by those with a weekly family income of £1086.32, and then slowly tapered at a rate
of 6.67%. Childcare expenditures, which were simply deducted from earnings when evaluating
eligibility (giving rise to an earnings disregard) up to 1999, generated a childcare credit worth
70% of the amount spent up to a limit of £135 per week by 2002. The reform in childcare support
resulted in a sharp increase in the maximum award (row 4), from £96.52 in 1999 to £174.80,
£180.00 and £186.30 in 2000, 2001 and 2002, respectively. This led the increase in entitlement
observed for families with childcare expenditures (row 8).
The tax system is individually assessed and consists of the overlapping schedules of taxes and
national insurance (both of which should be just perceived as tax rates), with their respective
thresholds for each rate.14 The fall in starting and basic tax rates, accompanied by a later change
in National Insurance rates affected the incentives to work and the tradeoffs between part-time and
full-time hours particularly for medium to high earners (Table 2). The most important changes
not shown in the table include the decline in the basic tax rate from 25% in 1991-95 down to 24%
in 1996 then to 23% in 1997 and to 22% in 2000. Also a new lower tax rate was introduced in
1992 at 20% and reduced to 10% in 1999.
The combined changes in taxes and benefits affected the work incentives of women across the
income distribution, with the former/latter being potentially more relevant for high/low income
families respectively. Previous studies have also highlighted the heterogeneous nature of the impact
of these reforms, depending on family circumstances and interactions with other taxes and benefits
(Brewer, Saez and Shephard, 2010). One important example is Housing Benefit, a large means-
tested rental subsidy program potentially affecting low income families. HB covers up to 100% of
rental costs, but the withdrawal rate is high (65% on net income). Families eligible for HB face
strong disincentives to work that the WFTC reform does not resolve. Our model will account for
the entire tax and welfare system and hence the integration between the various programs and
their impact on incentives will be fully taken into account.
14Historically National Insurance was supposed to fund pensions. However, this is a Pay-as-you-go component
of the UK pensions system and NI is effectively part of the income tax system.
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Figure 1 depicts the structure of the two systems. The left panel shows the amount of benefit
eligibility, while the right panel shows the resulting amount of disposable income, both as a
function of hours worked at the minimum wage. Eligibility for benefits at 16 hours and then at 30
generate the upwards shifts. The increase in net income is not as big as the increase in maximum
tax credit award described above because tax credits count as income in the calculation for some
other benefits not described here, but taken into account in the model. Figure 2 provides the
corresponding transfers and budget constraints for a woman with same characteristics but with a
partner working full time (if the partner does not work, the budget constraint is similar to that
in Figure 1).
3 Data and reduced form analysis
3.1 The Panel Data Sample
In estimation we make use of 18 waves (1991 to 2008) of the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS). All individuals in the original 1991 sample and subsequent booster samples remain in
9
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works 40 hours per week. All monetary values in 2008 prices. IS reform absent from figure because family not entitled to IS.
the panel from then onwards, apart from some lost because of attrition. Other individuals have
been added to the sample in subsequent periods – sometimes temporarily – as they formed families
with original interviewees or were born into them. All members of the household aged 16 and
above are interviewed, and a large set of demographic, educational and labor market information
is recorded, including expenditures on childcare and assets (the latter only every 5 years).
The unit of observation are women, to which we link information from the interview with the
partner when applicable. Families where the female is self-employed have been dropped to avoid
the difficulties relating to measuring their hours and earnings.15 Our full data set is an unbalanced
panel of 3,901 women aged between 19 and 50 observed at some point during the 1991-2008 period.
Almost 60% of those are observed for at least 5 years and over 20% are observed for at least 10
years, 25% are observed entering working life from education. Some summary descriptive statistics
by education and family composition are presented in Table 3. Further data details are provided
in Appendix A.
Our model does not deal with macroeconomic growth and fluctuations. In estimating the model
15The entire histories of 2.9% of self-employed women were dropped and partial histories (from the moment they
move to self employment) were dropped for another 3.1% of women
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Table 3: Distribution of family types in 2002 – women aged 19-50
Mothers Childless Number of
singles in couples women observations
All 0.10 0.44 0.46 2,096
(0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
By education
Secondary 0.15 0.49 0.36 839
(0.012) (0.017) (0.017)
High School 0.08 0.42 0.50 853
(0.010) (0.017) (0.017)
University 0.03 0.39 0.58 404
(0.008) (0.024) (0.025)
Notes: Based on BHPS data for 2002. Standard errors in parenthesis under estimates.
we therefore first remove aggregate growth from all monetary values, including the monetary
parameters in the tax and welfare system (such as tax thresholds and eligibility levels).16 To
limit the importance of measurement error in earnings and especially working hours, the wage
distribution was trimmed at percentiles 2 and 99 from below and above, respectively.17
Finally, assets play an important role in our model since they are a source of self-insurance and
saving is likely to respond to changes in taxes and welfare. Indeed Table 4 shows that assets are
relevant for all education groups: even among the lowest education group 58% hold some positive
financial assets. Once housing is taken into account net wealth holdings can be substantial.
Table 4: Assets by Education
Financial Assets Housing
Proportion Net assets (£1,000) Proportion For owners (£1,000)
Education positive average [p10,p90] Owners Value [p10,p90]
Secondary 0.58 3.0 [-1.9 , 8.3] 0.69 127.4 [51.9 , 225,6]
High-school 0.74 4.9 [-2.9 , 16.1] 0.74 158.7 [57.0 , 287.7]
University 0.82 9.9 [-5.1 , 28.2] 0.85 206.2 [75.0 , 379.1]
Notes: BHPS data. Values in 1,000s British pounds, 2008 prices. Excludes private and public pension wealth. Financial assets net
of debts, includes zeros. Gross house values. [p10,p90] in columns 3 and 6 stands for inter-decile range.
16We run 3 regressions, one for each education level, of log wages on time dummies and dummies of Scotland and
Wales, and create 3 education specific wage indices from the estimated time dummies. Then we aggregate these
indices using the (time-invariant) distribution of education for the entire population of workers aged 25-59 in the
sample to construct an aggregate wage index. All real monetary values (using the CPI) are then re-scaled using
this index to remove real growth.
17The censoring of the distribution from below is at £3.4 per hour in 2008 prices, well below the minimum wage.
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3.2 The Impact of the Tax Credit Reforms on the Labor Supply of
Single Mothers
The WFTC reform substantially increased the maximum benefit award both directly and through
increases in support for childcare. It also decreased the rate at which benefits are withdrawn
when earnings increase. It thus improved the incentives for single mothers to work. The contem-
poraneous reform to the income support (IS) system reduced the real value of the adult related
benefit, affecting all women (irrespective of children), but increased the child related benefit. This
latter reform counteracted somewhat the improved incentives for mothers with children due to
the WFTC reform.
We use single women without children as a comparison group to estimate the effect of the WFTC
and IS reforms on the labor supply of single mothers in a difference-in-differences framework - an
approach first used to estimate the effects of EITC on labor supply by Eissa and Liebman (1996)
and also used in the UK by Brewer et al. (2006). The data here is drawn from the UK Labor
Force Survey, a repeated cross section which is much larger then the BHPS and hence contains
enough single mothers.
In the top panel of Table 5 we show results of a simple difference in differences estimator for
employment, comparing the pre-reform 1999 data to the first post reform period in 2002 separately
for each education group.18 This is a linear probability model with employment as a dependent
variable. The reported coefficient is the interaction of being a single mother with a post-reform
dummy (2002). The regression also includes a dummy for single mother, and a full set of dummies
for time, age and age of the youngest child. The results indicate that the employment rates for
secondary and high school educated lone mothers increased by between four and five and a half
percentage points above the employment rates of similar single women without children; these are
highly significant. Those who have completed university are unaffected, as we expect, because
typically their earnings will be too high to benefit from the more generous support.
As a first robustness check we then use data from 1995 to 2004, which allows us to test for
18The reforms were implemented gradually, resulting in an empirical design that is not appropriate for a simple
discontinuity estimator.
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Table 5: Difference-in-differences employment regressions for lone mothers vs single women
(1) (2) (3)
Secondary High-School University
1999 compared to 2002 - Before and after all WFTC reforms
Impact on employment 0.042*** 0.055*** -0.005
Standard error (0.011) (0.015) (0.016)
Pooled Sample 1995-2004
Impact on Employment 0.0413** 0.0474* -0.0095
(0.0178) (0.0266) (0.0341)
lone-mothers x pre-reform linear trend 0.0016 -0.0086 -0.0105
(0.0040) (0.0067) (0.0087)
N 24,648 8,113 5,088
Notes: Data from the Labour Force Survey. Standard errors in parentheses. Top Panel: two period differences in differences
comparing pre-reform employment (1999) to post-reform (2002) for treatment (lone mothers) and comparison group (single women
with no children). Lower panel: pooled regression for 1995-2004, including pre-reform differential trend between lone mothers and
single childless women. All regressions include a a full set of dummies for time, age and age of youngest child and an indicator for
being a single mother. Impact on employment is coefficient on lone-mother x post-reform. ***,**,* indicates statistical significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
differential trends between the two comparison groups using the periods preceding the reforms
targeting single mothers specifically. We use a similar linear probability model for employment,
but now also control and test for pre-reform differential trends by adding an interaction of being
a single mother with a linear trend in the pre-reform period. Again, the estimated impact is the
coefficient of the interaction term between being a single mother and a dummy for post 2002. The
results are in the lower panel of Table 5. The impacts are basically the same as before and the
coefficient on the differential trend is completely insignificant and very small in all cases.
Table 6: Placebo effects on employment based on pre-WFTC reform data
Secondary education High-school University









1995 -0.003 0.001 -0.008 -0.009 0.025 -0.011 0.014 0.012 -0.036* -0.028 -0.018 -0.035*
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
1996 0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.033** -0.009 -0.013 0.013 0.018 0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
1997 -0.009 -0.007 0.026* 0.024 0.007 -0.013
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
1998 0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.017
(0.011) (0.001) (0.015) (0.017)
Notes: Data from the Labour Force Survey. Standard errors in parentheses. Difference-in-differences estimates compare lone
mothers with single women with no children (treatment and comparison groups) in pairs of years before and after pseudo-treatment.
Linear probability model of employment including time and single mother dummy and single mother dummy x post pseudo reform,
the coefficient of which is the pseudo impact reported. Other covariates included dummies for age and age of youngest child. Each
coefficient is from a separate regression. **,* indicates statistical significance at 5% and 10% respectively.
To further validate the approach we also implemented a set of placebo estimates on pairs of years
from the pre-reform period of 1995 to 1999, a period when no reforms took place that would have
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affected our two groups differentially. Estimates for the various pairs are presented in Table 6:
they are all very small and insignificant (except one in the High School group), with standard
errors of the same magnitude as those in Table 5.
Finally, Figure 3 presents a graphical comparison of the labor force participation of single women
without children to single mothers (the comparison and treatment groups, respectively). For
presentational purposes, we set the average labor force participation to be the same across the
demographic groups prior to the reform. The vertical line corresponds to 1999, when the reform
process for tax-credits started; it continued until the end of our observation period. These graphs
demonstrate visually that both groups evolved in the same way before the reform, irrespective of
education. But the trends diverge after the reform process started for the two lower education
groups, for whom the reform is most relevant, with an increase in the participation of single
mothers relative to that of single women with no children. As expected, the participation of
university-graduated single mothers looks unaffected by the reform as most will not be eligible for
in work benefits at their level of pay.
While the effects we estimate are specific to this institutional context, this exercise serves to show
that the combined reforms did indeed cause increases in the labor supply of single mothers and
establishes the order of magnitude that we can expect our model to replicate. It also shows that
the reforms are an important source of exogenous variation for the model.










































Notes: The dotted line represents the participation rate of single mothers, who were affected by the reform. The solid line
represents the participation rate of single women without children, who were not affected by the tax credit changes. We normalize
the participation rate of both groups to average zero pre-reform. The actual participation rates in 1999 for each of the education
groups in ascending order of education are 0.87, 0.94, 0.95 for singles with no children and 0.41, 0.65 and .0.80 for lone mothers.
The x-axis is year. The vertical line shows the last pre-reform year, 1999.
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3.2.1 Education choice and the welfare reform
The WFTC and IS reforms as well as tax reforms may also change education choices for young
people if they are perceived as permanent. This is because they change the future returns to
education and the amount of risk associated with each choice, particularly in the middle and low
end of the income distribution.
Consider first Figure 4. It shows the proportion of people in education at age 16, when it is
still compulsory, and at 17-21, when most post-compulsory education happens. For the latter,
there is a clear break in trend in 1999, at the time the reforms started being implemented. While
suggestive, using the break in trend to infer the impact on education is not a credible approach.
Quite apart from the fact the reforms were implemented gradually post 1999, there were other
time varying factors that may have induced this change in trend. For example, there were tax
reforms both before and after 1999 as well as an introduction of University fees in 1998 (£1000
per year) and a means tested educational subsidy for high school in 2004.19 As a result it does not
make much sense to use 1999 as a single break point of policy affecting education. Moreover, there
is no equivalent to the comparison group we used when considering the effects on labor supply
since everyone is affected by changes in the policy environment at the time of their education
choice.
To get a handle on how the policy induced changes in economic incentives affect education, we
specify a much simplified economic model where education choice depends on expected income
under alternative education choices. The approach we follow is similar in spirit to that of Blundell,
Duncan and Meghir (1998) for tax reform and labor supply and of Gruber and Saez (2002) for
estimating the taxable income elasticity.
We start by the observation that welfare and tax reform will affect people differently depending on
their background characteristics, which place them at different points on the earnings distribution
(in expectation). For example, if a person is predicted to have high earnings and strong labor
market attachment (even without post-compulsory education) their life-time expected income
19The Education Maintenance Allowance - see Dearden et al. (2009) for an evaluation preceding the rollout.
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1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008
year
16 17−21
Notes: The top line is the school participation rate of those who are 16 and for whom attendance is compulsory. The lower line
represents participation in post compulsory schooling for ages 17-21. The x-axis is year.
will not be very sensitive to changes the welfare parameters, which concern people with low
labor market attachment and low pay. By contrast the expected income of an individual whose
background characteristics predict her to be often out of work or in low pay will be very much
affected by the welfare reforms.20 We can exploit this insight to estimate the effect of the reforms
as mediated by changes in expected income. This is particularly useful because the same sort of
variation will be used in the structural model, but in a more complex setting.
To achieve this, we simulate life-cycle disposable income paths (including predicting spells out
of work) conditional on each of the three possible educational choices. These are constructed
as a function only of the tax and welfare system when the person was 17 and of observable
family background. We then construct expected lifetime income conditional on just compulsory
secondary education (EYC), conditional on just high school (EYHS) or university (EYU).
21
We need to be parsimonious in allowing for family background because we later build on this
20Family background includes the education of both parents (five levels each), number of siblings and sibling
order (dummies for no siblings, three or more siblings, and whether respondent is the first child), books in childhood
home (three levels) and whether lived with both parents when aged 16.
21To construct expected income we use the estimated earnings and transition equations from the structural model
introduced later in the paper to simulate sequences of disposable incomes over the lifecycle, conditional on each of
the three education choices, initial family background (summarized in two factors) and on the tax/welfare system
prevailing when the person was 17. We then average over many different career paths for each education level,
conditioning only on the family background characteristics and the relevant tax/benefit system. In this way the
expected income per education varies only with family background and tax and welfare system.
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approach to specify our model, in which background characteristics enter preferences and wages.
Thus we have to limit the size of the state space.22 Our solution was to extract two principal
component factors (f1 and f2) from the set of background characteristics.
23 In this way we use all
information in a parsimonious and efficient way. The resulting variability in the expected income
measures depends only on the policy reforms and the two factors.
Defining the outcome variable as a dummy for attendance in post compulsory schooling (PCit)
we run the regression
PCit = time dummies + α1f1 + α2f2 + α3 ln(EYC) + α4 ln(EYHS) + α5 ln(EYU) + uit
The results are presented in Table 7. The first factor (f1) has a strong positive effect on educational
attainment, confirming it can discriminate across different types: educational attainment differs
by about 20 percentage points over the support of f1. The second factor is not significant. In
columns 1-3 we include the simulated value of expected lifetime income for the lowest education
group only. This is always highly significantly negative as expected (since it makes the lowest
level of education relatively more attractive). The result remains unchanged and significant when
we include differential trends by background factors (column 2) and even when allow for these
trends to differ pre and post 1999 (column 3 – we can do this because reforms are implemented
throughout the period and there is more than just pre and post 1999 variability; all included
regressors explain only 38% of the variability in lnEYC).
The bottom of Table 7 shows that the average expected incomes corresponding to all education
levels increased following the reform, but EYC followed by EYHS increased the most as expected
given the nature of the reforms. Column 4 in the Table shows that the expected incomes cor-
responding to the two higher education groups have a positive effect as expected but are less
22We could construct a one dimensional probability of attending post-compulsory education by regressing post-
compulsory schooling attendance on family background in one single cross section and then use the resulting
predicted probability as the variable discriminating between types of individuals. However, Abadie et al. (2014)
show that this is likely to lead to biased effects of heterogeneous impacts.
23Using this more limited information rather than all family background variables does not cause bias, but it
could reduce efficiency. The first principal component accounts for 17% of the data variability. It is associated
with more educated parents, fewer siblings, being the eldest child and more books at home.
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Table 7: The Effect of expected income on post-compulsory schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(EYC) −0.6388∗∗ −0.6417∗∗ −0.6215∗∗ −1.4018∗∗






∗∗∗ 0.1035∗∗∗ 0.0999∗∗∗ 0.1063∗∗∗
(0.0085) (0.0154) (0.0197) (0.0203)
f2 -0.0135 0.0431
∗∗∗ -0.0024 -0.0079
(0.0102) (0.0141) (0.0184) (0.0207)
f1 × t -0.0010 0.0006 0.0008
(0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0034)
f2 × t −0.0053∗∗∗ −0.0055∗ −0.0054∗
(0.0019) (0.0030) (0.0030)
f1× t× post− ref -0.0228 −0.0235∗
(0.0136) (0.0134)
f2× t× post− ref 0.0233∗∗ 0.0219∗∗
(0.0102) (0.0103)
f1× post− ref 0.0571 0.0577
(0.0534) (0.0527)
f2× post− ref -0.0596 -0.0569
(0.0374) (0.0379)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treatment Effect
Average Effect −0.0089∗∗ −0.0090∗∗ −0.0087∗∗ −0.0090∗∗
St. Error (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0044)















Notes: Linear probability model on BHPS data. Cohorts 1970-85. The dependent variable is one for those with post-compulsory
education and zero otherwise. post− ref is a dummy for post-reform (cohorts 1982+); t is a linear time trend; f1 and f2 are the
first two principal components extracted from the family background variables (the education of both parents (five levels each),
number of siblings and sibling order (dummies for no siblings, three or more siblings, and whether respondent is the first child),
books in childhood home (three levels) and whether lived with both parents when aged 16.) The means of the factors (f1, f2) are
(0.9, -0.033 ), the lowest quartile, the median and the top quartile are (-0.067, -1.02), (1.217, -0.086) and (2.08, 0.92) respectively.
significant, particularly so for EYU which is the least affected by the reforms.
The results are consistent with what we expect and are remarkably robust. Put together they imply
that the changes in expected income induced by the reform cause a decline in post-compulsory
education of 0.9 percentage points (st. error 0.44). Given that EYC changed by 1.4%, this is a
substantial effect. When we repeat this exercise using as dependent variable university attendance
(versus less) we obtain a decline of 0.52 percentage points, which however is not significant (st.




The reduced form analysis establishes the responsiveness of important decisions to changes in
taxes and transfers. However, it has little to say about the mechanisms underlying choices and
ignores the effects of risk on behavior. The model we develop below allows us to understand
the longer term effects of policy on behavior and on welfare, to carry out counterfactual analysis
and to address policy questions from a normative perspective as well (see Stantcheva, 2015 for
example).
4.1 Outline of the model
At the age of 17 a woman chooses between leaving education with a secondary degree, completing
high school or completing college. Upon completing education, women enter the labor market
at the age of 19 for those completing high school or less, and at the age of 22 for university
graduates. From then onwards, we model annual consumption and labor supply choices – one
of unemployment, part-time or full-time employment. Women retire at the age of 60 (the state
pension retirement age for all women over this period), and live for another 10 years from their
accumulated savings.24 Households are credit constrained and, with the exception of university
loans, they cannot borrow.
In every period a woman may have a child (up to the age of 43), may get married or get divorced.
These events occur randomly over the life-cycle according to an education-specific stochastic pro-
cess that depends on her current family arrangements and that replicates what we see in the data.
For computational reasons we simplify the problem by not treating these demographic events
as explicit choices. Hence our counterfactual simulations are conditional on the status quo pro-
cesses and abstract from the implications of changes in behavior in those dimensions.25 However,
24See also Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) and, for men, French (2005) and van der Klaauw and
Wolpin (2005).
25Studies that endogenize marriage and fertility decisions include van der Klaauw (1996), Francesconi (2002),
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changing educational decision implies a change in the relevant marriage and child-bearing process.
Moreover, the model accounts for marital sorting by education as observed in the data (see for
example Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss, 2012).
Wages depend on actual experience, which may depreciate when out of work and accumulates
at potentially different rates when working part-time versus full-time. This explains how career
breaks and part-time work shape female wages and work incentives. Individual productivity is
subject to persistent shocks, whose distribution depend on unobserved preferences for work and
constitute an important source of risk.26
Observed ex ante heterogeneity in the model is driven by the woman’s family background, sum-
marized by the two principal component factors we introduced earlier; to keep the size of the state
space manageable we discretize them into binary indicators when they are included in preferences
for working and wages – they form four distinct observed types.
Educational choice depends on the background factors and on a liquidity shock to parental income.
We measure this as the residual from a regression of parental income when the woman was 16
on the entire set of background variables – intended to control for permanent income, which is
possibly correlated with preferences and abilities. We assume this does not affect preferences
and wages, acting as an exclusion restriction, and its role is to explain differences in educational
attainment of otherwise identical individuals, attributing these to liquidity constraints.
Women also differ in unobserved dimensions. At 17, they each draw a random cost of education
and a random preference for work (consisting of a utility cost of part time work and a utility cost
of full time work); both inform the education choice. When starting working life, they draw an
initial productivity level from a distribution that depends on their random preference for work
and their education. In addition to these, there are persistent idiosyncratic shocks to wages and
male earnings, which will be described later.
All choices are affected by the tax and welfare system, which differs by cohort and defines dispos-
Keane and Wolpin (2010) and Adda et al. (2015).
26See also Huggett et al. (2011), who consider heterogeneity in wage profiles, and Adda et al. (2015), who allow
for a flexible specification of human capital accumulation by working hours.
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able income under each employment option. Further reforms to the system during working life
are treated as unexpected surprises. We use FORTAX, a tax and benefit micro-simulation tool
to draw accurate budget constraints by family circumstances, accounting for all the detail in the
tax and welfare system in place at each point in time.27 We now explain the model formally.
4.2 Working life
In each year of her adult life, a woman maximizes expected lifetime utility taking as given her
current characteristics and economic circumstances. These are her age (t), education (s), accu-
mulated assets (a), work experience (e), idiosyncratic productivity (υ), her family background
(x1, x2) where xj is a dummy for whether above the median in the distribution of factor fj,
28
and a two-dimensional discrete unobserved factor θ = (θF , θP ) characterizing her preferences for
working full time (θF ) or part time (θP ). They also include her family circumstances and related
information: the presence of a partner (m), his education (s̃), whether he is employed or not
(l̃ = F/O for Full-time hours and Out of work, respectively) and productivity (υ̃), the presence
of children (k), age of the youngest child (tk) and whether she has access to free childcare (dcc).
We denote by Xt the vector of state variables in period t, including these two sets of variables. In
all that follows, lowercase letters represent individual observed characteristics, the tilde denotes
men’s variables, uppercase letters are for market prices and sets of variables, and Greek letters are
reserved for the model parameters and unobserved shocks. Except for unobserved preferences for
work and productivity, all other shocks and random components of the model are independent of
each other.29
We assume that utility is intertemporally separable, and that instantaneous utility depends on
consumption per adult equivalent, female labor supply, family background, family circumstances
and preferences for work. Her instantaneous utility is non-separable between consumption and
27See Shephard (2009) and Shaw (2011).
28Discretizing the factors is an approximation used to limit the size of the state space and make the problem
computationally tractable. In principle we could improve the approximation by adding more discrete points.
29To be clear, the random components of the model of the working life are the female preferences for work,
whether she has access to free childcare when working, her productivity, the arrival of a child, the arrival and
departure of a partner, and his education and productivity.
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leisure. At age t it is given by




exp {U (lt, θ, Zt)} (1)
where n is the equivalence scale,30 c is total family consumption, l is female labor supply and
assumes three possible values: not working (O), working part-time (P) and working full-time
(F). The function U reflects how the marginal utility of consumption changes with working, by
the woman’s education, background characteristics and family demographics; it is normalized to
zero if the woman is not working. Finally, µ is the curvature parameter determining both risk
aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Since µ will be negative, a positive U for
l = P, F implies that working reduces the utility of consumption and that consumption and labor
supply are complements as indeed is the case in Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1994), who use
consumption data from the UK.31 U is specified as follows
U (lt, θ, Zt) =
 0 if lt = O (Out of work)θl + Z ′tα(lt) if lt = P or F (Part time or Full time)
where α(lt) = αF + αP × 1(lt = P )
where Zt is a subset of the woman’s characteristics, including whether she is single or with a
partner, and whether she is a mother; these are interacted with a dummy for the three education
levels (secondary, high school or university). It also includes a dummy for the age of the youngest
child (0-2, 3-5, 6-10 or 11+), a dummy for the partner working or not and the background factors
x1 and x2, allowing preferences to depend on background.
The bivariate vector θ = (θF , θP ) reflects unobserved heterogeneity and can take two values: one
for low utility cost of work and one for high cost of work.32 The values of θ, the probability of
being low-cost of work, and the other unknown utility parameters described by α(l) for l = F, P
30n=1 for singles, 1.6 for couples 1.4 for mother with child and 2 for a couple with children.
31For more evidence on this see Ziliak and Kniesner (2005) and Shaw (1989).
32We did experiment with a richer distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, but this did not significantly improve
the fit of the model or change the results.
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are estimated alongside the other parameters of the model.
At any age t during working life, the woman’s decision problem can be written as:






βτ−tu (cτ , lτ ; θ, Zτ )
∣∣∣∣∣Xt
}
subject to the Budget constraint
where the expectation E is taken over all future random events conditional on the available infor-
mation Xt, β is the discount factor and Vt is the optimum value of discounted present and future
utility. t̄ is 10 years after retirement and the family lives off its savings during the retirement
period.33
The budget constraint is described in terms of the asset evolution equation





at+1 > as, with initial and terminal conditions: a0 = 0 and at̄+1 = 0
(2)
where r is the risk-free interest rate, (w, w̃) are the hourly wage rates of wife and husband, (h, h̃)
are the working hours of wife and husband (respectively 0, 18 and 38 hours corresponding to O,
P and F for women, and 0 and 40 corresponding to O and F for men), and as represents the
borrowing limit; the latter is either zero or the amount of the student loan borrowed (a negative
number). The tax and transfer function, T , unifies the tax and welfare system, describing the
total incentive structure faced by an individual at all income levels and turns out to be a complex
non-concave, non-smooth and often discontinuous function of income, hours of work and family
composition. It depends on hours because tax credits in the UK depend on hours thresholds (16
and 30).34 Households start life with a particular tax and welfare system and face reforms over
their lifetime, which are treated as unanticipated. The age at which the reforms occur varies
depending on the cohort to which individuals belong.
33This ensures that individuals save towards retirement above their social security contributions, which in the
UK only replaces a small proportion of their working earnings.
34T includes income tax, social security contributions, and the main subsidies for working-age families, namely
income support, job-seekers allowance, tax credits, housing benefit, council tax benefit, child benefit. These are
described in appendix F, together with the main reforms over 90s and 00s.
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Finally, Q are childcare costs. Pre-school children need childcare whenever no adult is staying at
home, and school-age children only need childcare outside the school day as education is publicly
provided. Childcare costs are zero for those with access to informal care (dcc = 0) the probability








ht ∗ CCh if dcc = 1 and tk 6 5 and
(
h̃t = 40 or mt = 0
)
18 ∗ CCh if dcc = 1 and 5 < tk 6 10 and ht = 38 and
(
h̃t = 40 or mt = 0
)
0 all other cases
where CCh is the constant per-hour rate, which we set to a number obtained from the data.
Female human capital and earnings dynamics The female wage process including the
distribution of all shocks is education-specific (indexed by s). It is given by
lnwmt = bs,0 + bs,1x1 + bs,1x2 + (γs,0 + γs,1x1 + γs,2x2) ln (et + 1) + υt + ξt (3)
lnwt = lnw
m
t − ξt (4)
et = et−1 (1− δs) + gs (lt−1) (5)
υt = ρsυt−1 + ζt (6)
where lnwmt is the observed hourly wage rate, ξ is iid Normal measurement error, lnwt is the wage
rate on which individual decisions are based and et is experience.
35 Importantly, we also allow for
the background variables (x1, x2) to affect wage levels and growth. The individual productivity
process, υt, follows an AR(1) process with normally distributed innovations, ζt; hence, purely
transitory variation in wages is attributed to measurement error and does not affect the decision
process. The initial productivity shock is distributed as a mixture of two normals with means
that depend on unobserved preferences θ.
Experience depreciates at a rate δs per period; its accumulation depends on whether the person
35wmt is the ratio of usual weekly earnings by usual weekly hours, the latter being capped at 70.
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is working full time or part time: gs(F ) = 1 while gs(P ) is an education specific number to
be estimated, defining the experience value of part time work. The experience profile of wages is
concave as in Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) if the return to experience in wages (γs,0+γs,1x1+γs,2x2)
is smaller than one.
Male employment and earnings We assume men in couples either work full-time (l̃ = F ) or
are out of work (l̃ = O). Their hourly wage and employment are exogenous and are given by
Prob
[









if mt−1 = 1
Prob [ν̃0t > b0 (t, s̃t)] if mt−1 = 0
(7)
ln w̃mt = b̃s̃ + γ̃s̃ ln (t− 18) + υ̃t + ξ̃t, t > 18 (8)
ln w̃t = ln w̃
m
t − ξ̃t (9)
υ̃t = ρ̃s̃υ̃t−1 + ζ̃t (10)
where ln w̃mt is measured log wage, ln w̃t is the log wage that matters for decisions and ξ̃ is taken
to be an iid normal measurement error.36 The shock to wages υ̃t, is an AR(1) process with normal
innovations and normal initial values, all dependent on his education, s̃. The dependence between
the earnings and employment of spouses is captured by the correlation in their education levels,
as will be detailed below.
The dynamics of family composition Family dynamics are stochastic and education specific
but exogenously set to reproduce the patterns observed in the data. If a child is present then k = 1
and tk is her/his age. In the model only the age of the youngest child matters for preferences and
costs. Hence, when a new child arrives we reinitialize tk to zero. The probability that a new child
arrives depends on the age and education of the woman, whether she has other children and the
36In order to avoid including both male and female age in the state space and so as to allow for the fact that
female and male age are highly correlated in practice, we include female age in the male earnings equation instead
of male age. This simplifies the computations, while allowing age effects on male earnings, which is important in
a life-cycle model.
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age of the youngest child, and whether she is married (described by m). It is given by
Prob
[
tk = 0 | t, s, kt−1, tkt−1,mt−1
]
(11)
Once a child is born, she/he will live with the mother until (and including) 18 years of age. If the
woman is married then m = 1 and s̃ is the education of the partner. The transition probability is
given by
Prob [mt, s̃t | t, s,mt−1, s̃t−1, kt−1] (12)
where s̃t−1 (s̃t) is only observed if mt−1 = 1 (mt = 1).
37
4.3 Educational choice
Investments in education are decided at the start of active life, when the woman is aged 17, based
on the balance of realized costs and expected value of each educational alternative. Labor market
entry happens at 19 for those with high school or less (s = 1 or 2) and at age 22 for university
graduates (s = 3) and there is no re-entry into full time ducation.38 The opportunity cost of
education for those aged 17-18 is captured by the estimated non-pecuniary costs of education.




where Bs measures the utility costs of the investment, defined as
Bs (X17) = π1sf1 + π2sf2 + π5syp +$s.
37As specified, fertility, marriage and the type of spouse depend on education but not on other choices such as
labor supply, and does not depend on experience. This simplification allows us to estimate these processes outside
the full dynamic model, simplifying considerably the computations.
38Individuals choosing to acquire professional education, including that providing on-the-job training, are classi-
fied as students when aged 17 to 18. It is being assumed that individuals 18 and younger have loose labor-market
attachment, not conducive of experience accumulation.
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yp is the liquidity shock to parental income (after removing all observed information on permanent
family characteristics when the woman is 16 years old); (f1, f2) are the continuous parental back-
ground factors, which capture permanent family heterogeneity and are discretized as described
before to enter the rest of the model; $s is the unobserved utility cost of education s, assumed to
be normally distributed with variance σ2s . Finally, Ws is the discounted expected value of lifetime
utility if the woman chooses education level s. It is given by
Ws (X17) =








t−19u (ct, F ; θ, Z17) + β
22−19V22 (X22)
}∣∣∣∣X17, s] if s = 3
where Z17 summarizes the relevant information for the instantaneous utility (as in equation (1))
and it is assumed that university years carry a utility cost similar to that of full-time work in excess
of the education specific preferences described by $s. University students fund their consumption
needs and education costs, that vary across generations depending on the tuition fees (D), out
of their institutional student loans. Therefore, optimization is therefore subject to the budget
constraint
a19 = a17 = 0
a22 = −(1 + r)2c19 − (1 + r)c20 − c21 −D if s = 3
5 Estimation
We follow a two-step procedure to estimate the parameters of the model. In a first step we estimate
the equations for the predetermined elements of the model, given education choices, including the
dynamics of marriage, divorce, fertility, male labor supply, male earnings and the cost of childcare.
Details and estimates can be found in Appendix B.
We set the utility function coefficient µ to -0.56 giving a risk aversion coefficient of 1.56, consistent
with the findings in Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1994) and Attanasio and Weber (1995), both
of which allow for nonseparability of leisure and consumption as in this model. Finally, the annual
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discount factor β is set to 0.98 as for example in Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos (2008).39
The annual risk-free interest rate is set to 0.015, which is slightly lower than the discount rate thus
implying that agents have some degree of impatience. The tuition cost of university education is
allowed to vary as it changed over this period and the credit limit for university students (and
graduates throughout their life) is £5,000 consistent with university education policy of the late
1990s in the UK. No further credit is allowed. The remaining parameters determining preferences
and female wages are estimated using the method simulated of moments.40
Estimation exploits the policy changes over time. In order to use this available source of exogenous
variation, we construct moments conditional on the two factors representing family background,
on the value of the parental liquidity shock (that affects education choice) and on the year in
which the individual became 16, which determines the original tax and welfare system they were
facing as well as the age at which they faced any subsequent reforms. In this way we allow for
the variation induced by changes in the policy environment and how this impacts different types
of people based on their background, to help identification of the parameters. This implies that
the model is estimated by comparing the behavior of different cohorts, who are facing different
policy environments. Hence a key identifying assumption is that preferences do not change across
cohorts and that differences can be attributed to policy changes.
We then solve the model and simulate the lifecycle choices of 19,505 women (5 replications of the
3,901 women profiles observed in the BHPS) using the observed distribution of family background
and parental liquidity shock and the history of the tax and welfare systems that she faced. Our
solution algorithm underlying these simulations is described in the web appendix and is based
on a modified version of the algorithms in Fella (2014) and Iskhakov et al. (2015). The main
difficulty in solving dynamic problems that combine discrete and continuous choices is that the
the value function is neither smooth nor concave. The way we deal with these issues is described
in Appendix C.
39We have experimented varying the discount factor to as low as 0.95, but we did not get substantive changes in
behavior.
40Original references are Lerman and Manski (1981), McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989). See also
Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault (1993a and 1993b) or Gallant and Tauchen (1996).
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For each simulated profile, we select an observation window that matches her data counterpart
so that the simulated sample exactly reproduces the time and age structure of the observed
data. Again to limit the computational burden we impose the simplification that women face
up to four policy regimes over the observation window, representing the main tax and benefits
systems operating during the 1990s and early 2000s.41 Finally, we compute the moments using the
simulated dataset, equivalent to those computed using observed data and evaluate the objective
function. The estimates Θ̂ are defined by
Θ̂ = argminΘ{ΣKk=1[(MdkN −Mmks(Θ))2/V ar(MdkN)]} (13)
where the sum is over the K moments, Mdkn denotes the kth data moment estimated over N
observations, Mmks(Θ) represents the kth simulated moment evaluated at parameter value Θ over
s simulations.
As suggested by Altonji and Segal (1996) we do not use the asymptotically optimal weight matrix
because of its potentially poor small-sample properties. The simulation procedure controls for any
initial conditions problem by starting the simulation at the start of life. Unobserved heterogeneity
is allowed for in the construction of the simulated moments. The moments we match are listed in
Appendix D. We compute asymptotic standard errors following Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault
(1993). This corrects for the effects of simulation noise.42
6 Parameter estimates
Table 8 reports the estimates for the female wage process. Both the wage rates at the start
of working life and the returns to experience increase with education. We illustrate the effect
of education on wages in row 4, which shows the mean wage rates by education for 25 year-old
41As mentioned earlier, we adopted the 1995, the 1999, the 2002 and the 2004 regimes and assumed they operated
over the periods prior to 1996, 1997 to 1999, 2000 to 2002 and 2003 onwards, respectively.
42Estimation of the standard errors of the structural parameters takes the parameters estimated in the first
estimation stage as fixed. Allowing for the variation in first stage to be accounted in estimating second-stage
standard errors is prohibitively demanding in terms of computation time.
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women who have continuously worked full-time. In row 8 we show the average return to experience,
which increases with education, pointing to a complementarity between education and on-the-job
learning.
Table 8: Female wage equation and experience accumulation
Education
Secondary High school University
(1) (2) (3)
(1) Intercept (bs,0) 5.406 5.547 6.949
(0.030) (0.038) (0.071)
(2) increment: high factor 1 (bs,1) 0.005 0.018 0.061
(0.040) (0.038) (0.066)
(3) increment: high factor 2 (bs,2) 0.014 -0.186 0.045
(0.036) (0.031) (0.048)
(4) Mean hourly wage rate at 25 7.19 8.64 10.55
(.050) (.067) (.317)
Returns to experience
(5) baseline (γs,0) 0.152 0.229 0.306
(0.006) (0.009) (0.011)
(6) increment: high factor 1 (γs,1) 0.054 0.014 -0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
(7) increment: high factor 2 (γs,2) -0.002 0.029 -0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
(8) Mean value of the coefficient on experience 0.16 0.25 0.30
(.008) (.012) (.014)
Distribution of unobserved productivity
(9) autocorrelation coefficient: ρs 0.925 0.916 0.880
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
(10) st. deviation of innovation in productivity:
√
Var (ζs) 0.125 0.154 0.139
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
(11) mean of initial productivity for type I: E (υ0s|type I) 0.140 0.111 0.306
(0.011) (0.028) (0.015)
(12) st. deviation initial productivity:
√
Var (υ0s) 0.145 0.202 0.223
(0.012) (0.015) (0.016)
Human capital dynamics
(13) while in Part-Time work: gs(P ) 0.150 0.096 0.116
(0.015) (0.022) (0.013)
(14) depreciation rate: δs 0.081 0.057 0.073
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Mean hourly wages (row 4) are assessed at age 25 if women worked full time since the start
of their working life. The mean returns to experience (row 8) are averages over the population, conditional on education. The mean
initial productivity (row 11) is for individuals with high preferences for working (type I). The population mean initial productivity
is zero.
Human capital depreciates between 5.7% and 8.1% a year depending on the education group (row
14), which imposes a very large cost for time spent out of work. Importantly, when working part-
time the amount of human capital accumulated is a fraction of that accumulated in full time jobs
(row 13), at most barely counteracting the effects of depreciation. For example, a year of part-
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time work is worth only 15% of a full time one in terms of acquired experience among the lowest
skill group. Effectively working part-time leads to almost no improvements in human capital for
women who have little accumulated experience, and may even be associated with a loss of human
capital for the more experienced individuals. This result, together with the persistence of working
choices, contributes to explaining why, in the cross section, women working part-time are paid on
average a lower hourly rate than those working full-time – we term this the part-time penalty.
A key element of the model is the stochastic process of wages, because it is a main source of
uncertainty and leads people to value programs for the insurance they provide. The autocorrelation
coefficient, ρs, reported in row 9, is very high but not quite a unit root. The standard deviation
of the shocks (row 10) implies a high degree of uncertainty for next period’s wage rate and there
is substantial heterogeneity in wages at the start of life (row 12). Finally, the family background
factors shape the wage profiles of the two lower education groups but not (significantly) that of
college graduates.
In Table 9 we report the preference parameters determining the U function in equation 2. In
reading the table note that positive and larger values of the coefficients make working less attractive
because utility is negative (i.e, the parameter driving risk aversion, µ in equation (1), is negative).
Moreover the coefficients in column (3) on part-time work are incremental to those in full-time
work and reflect the difference of part-time from full-time work.
The parameters in column (1) of Table 9 imply that U for full time work is always positive,
meaning that working carries a utility cost for all groups. The parameters in column (3) are
negative but smaller in absolute terms than the ones in column (1), implying part-time work
yields a lower disutility than full-time work. The utility cost of working is higher for single women
than for women in couples. These results are consistent with similar employment rates across
marital status for women without children and lower employment rates among lower-educated
single mothers than among their married counterparts. Children, particularly of pre-school age,
increase the utility costs of working and more so for full-time. Preferences depend on education,
particularly amongst singles. Indeed to rationalize the data given the budget constraint, the single
university graduates are attributed a higher disutility from full-time work. We also find that the
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Table 9: Estimates of preference parameters – function U in equation (1)
coeff st. error coeff st. error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Utility parameters
all employment part-time employment
αF αP
(1) Singles, no children: Sec 0.344 (0.011) -0.269 (0.009)
(2) Singles, no children: HS 0.412 (0.013) -0.315 (0.012)
(3) Singles, no children: Univ 0.555 (0.014) -0.382 (0.012)
(4) Married, no children: Sec 0.226 (0.013) -0.154 (0.009)
(5) Married, no children: HS 0.222 (0.011) -0.156 (0.008)
(6) Married, no children: Univ 0.276 (0.013) -0.180 (0.010)
(7) Single mothers: Sec 0.375 (0.010) -0.161 (0.006)
(8) Single mothers: HS 0.330 (0.019) -0.142 (0.015)
(9) Single mothers: Univ 0.372 (0.016) -0.184 (0.066)
(10) Married mothers: Sec 0.226 (0.011) -0.168 (0.009)
(11) Married mothers: HS 0.233 (0.012) -0.180 (0.009)
(12) Married mothers: Univ 0.282 (0.015) -0.212 (0.012)
(13) Child aged 0-2 0.156 (0.010) -0.095 (0.008)
(14) Child aged 3-5 0.093 (0.010) -0.067 (0.009)
(15) Child aged 6-10 0.047 (0.008) -0.027 (0.007)
(16) Partner working -0.077 (0.009) 0.066 (0.007)
(17) High background factor 1 0.002 (0.007) 0.000 (0.005)
(18) High background factor 2 0.006 (0.006) 0.001 (0.005)
Unobserved heterogeneity in cost of work
full-time employment part-time employment
θF θP
(19) Type I -0.193 (0.006) -0.093 (0.005)
(20) Type I: probability 0.361 (.005)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The utility costs of working full-time and part-time for preference type II are selected to
set the population mean of the utility parameters θF and θP to zero.
presence of a working partner (row (16)) further reduces the cost of working, implying some
complementarity between the labour supply of partners (as in Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-
Eksten, 2012). It is interesting that family background does not directly affect preferences.
As in the reduced form analysis, Table 10 shows that family background matters for education
and increased parental liquidity at 16 increases attainment and particularly so for University
attendance. Beyond this, the unobserved random costs of education are also important in driving
education choices, which explains why observationally similar people make different education
decisions.
Mothers may face positive childcare costs if all adults in the household are working, in which case
the cost of childcare is £2.60 per working hour for children under the age of 5 or per working
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Table 10: Estimates of preferences for education and probability of positive childcare costs if
working
High School University
coeff st. error coeff st. error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) intercept -0.053 (0.025) 0.682 (0.015)
(2) background factor 1 0.227 (0.012) 0.363 (0.014)
(3) background factor 2 0.009 (0.022) 0.299 (0.011)
(4) parental liquidity shock when aged 16 0.305 (0.158) 0.695 (0.036)
(5) st. deviation unobserved utility cost of education (
√
V$s) 1.579 (0.093) 1.015 (0.183)
(6) Probability of positive childcare costs 0.576 (.014)
Notes: Residual parental income constructed from regression of parental income on all long-term background characteristics when
the woman is 16 years old.
hour in excess of 18 hours per week for children aged 5 to 10. The probability that this happens
is estimated to be about 58% (row 6 of Table 10), meaning that the rest have informal sources of
childcare.
7 Model fit and Implications for Behavior
7.1 Wages and Employment
The life-cycle profiles of wage rates for working women are presented in Figure 5 for each education
group. These fit the observed profiles well and show the lowest education group having the most
flat profile becoming steeper for higher education groups. Figure 6 shows that this pattern is
replicated across the percentiles of the life-cycle wage distribution and demonstrates that the
model can reproduce the observed dispersion of wages. The flattening out in the observed profiles
is in part because of the increasing prevalence of part-time work later in the life-cycle. Part-time
workers have very low returns to experience according to our estimates, just about managing to
avoid depreciation of human capital.
The part-time penalty relative to women working full-time continuously is illustrated in Figure 7.
To understand its implications for wage formation, given actual labor supply behavior, we show
the effect of switching off components of wage growth in Table 11. Thus the part-time penalty
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Notes: BHPS versus simulated data, in solid and dashed lines respectively. 2008 prices.
implies female wages are lower by between 5.3% and 7.8% when the woman is 50 and given the
observed periods of part-time work. If in addition we eliminate the experience cost of being out
of work wages would be higher by between 10.5% and 14.3% at 50. The realized cost of part-
time and out-of-work spells by age 50 are lowest for the least educated group, despite their lower
labor market attachment, since their return to experience is actually very low. This component of
the model is crucial for understanding the mechanisms through which welfare programs can have
longer run effects.
Table 11: The effect of observed part-time and non-work patterns on wages at 50
No part-time penalty No penalty for not working
and no part-time penalty
Secondary (%) 5.3 10.5
High School (%) 7.0 12.5
University (%) 7.8 14.3
The first column shows the effect on wages at 50 if the amount of experience gained from part-time work is the same as that of full
time work; the second column cancels, in addition, the experience cost of not working. The pattern of part-time work and full-time
work is kept fixed at what actually happens.
Figure 8 shows lifecycle employment patterns. The top panel shows that employment rates are
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Notes: BHPS versus simulated data. 2008 prices. All curves smoothed using kernel weights and a bandwidth of 2 years.
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Notes: All values in log wage units. Curves represent difference in accumulated experience between women taking part-time work
from the age of 31 onwards as compared to taking full-time work over the same period, all conditional on full-time employment up
to the age of 30.
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Notes: BHPS versus simulated data, in solid and dashed lines respectively. Lines by time to/since childbirth in the bottom panel
are smoothed using kernel weights and a bandwidth of 2 years.
U-shaped, reflecting child rearing, and increase with education. In the lower panel we align these
graphs with reference to the timing of births. The dip in employment caused by children is less
pronounced for higher levels of education. The model fits these patterns remarkably well. A full
set of model comparisons with the data moments used in estimation is presented in Appendix D.
In Table 12 we emulate the differences-in-differences estimator for the full set of reforms imple-
mented between 1999 and 2002 and shown earlier. Given the nature of the exercise, where we
are looking at immediate short-run effects, we do not allow education choices to respond and
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we treat the reform as a surprise. This estimator compares the employment of single mothers
(the treatment group) to similar single women without children. The simulation in Table 12 pro-
duces an estimated difference-in-differences parameter of 5.6 percentage points (pp) increase in
employment resulting from the reforms for the secondary education group. This compares to a
difference-in-differences estimate from the data of 4.2pp. For high school graduates the simulation
and the estimate are 4.9pp and 5.5pp respectively. All these differences are small and well within
the margin of estimation error; similarly for the University group the effects are very small in both
data and simulation.43 Although, we used the reforms in estimation as a source of variations, we
did not target the effect itself and the fact the results match is encouraging for the model.
Table 12: The impact of the reforms on the employment rates of lone mothers – model simulations
versus DiD data estimates
Secondary High school University
(1) Estimates based on LFS data 4.2 5.5 -0.5
St. Error (1.1) (1.5) (1.6)
(2) Model simulation 5.6 4.9 1.4
Notes: Row 1 displays the result from the difference-in-differences as in the top panel of Table 5. Row 2 shows the results of similar
calculations on simulated data from the model.
7.2 Education choice
To validate the model predictions on education, we use the reduced-form specification of education
choice and the implied effects of the change in expected lifetime income induced by the 1999-2002
reforms described in column (4) of Table 7 and compare them to the simulated effects of the
same reform. Row 2 in Table 13 shows that the model predictions are close to the reduced form
estimates. The impact is larger at the high school level as expected, but is also noticeable at the
university level (albeit not significant in the data). The reform increases the generosity of benefits
and increases the range of income that allow eligibility and, crucially, reduces income risk for low
to medium income families. The model implies that this may impact education choices even at a
high level for a small group of women.
43See Eissa and Liebman (1996) for similar differences-in-differences estimates of the US Earned Income Tax
Credit in the US.
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Table 13: The impact of the reforms on education attainment – model simulations versus data
estimates
High school University
(1) Estimates based on BHPS data -0.0090 -0.0052
St. Error (0.0044) (0.0046)
(2) Model simulation -.0069 -0.0049
Notes: Row 1 displays the data estimates of the average impact of the 1999-2002 reforms on education attainment, as in column 4
of Table 7. Row 2 shows model predictions of the impact of the same reform under revenue neutrality.
Finally, we simulate the effect of reducing University tuition by £1000. We find that University
attendance increases by 1.9 percentage point. As a comparison Kane (2003) and Deming and
Dynarski (2009) find that $1000 decrease in tuition in the US increases college attendance by 3-5
percentage points. Our effect is thus smaller, but comparable. The implication is that in the US
the impact of welfare on educational attainment may perhaps be larger than what we find here
for the UK.
7.3 Elasticities of labor supply
Table 14: Elasticities of labor supply
Frisch Marshall
extensive intensive extensive intensive
elasticity derivative elasticity elasticity derivative elasticity
All women 0.627 0.510 0.240 0.475 0.386 0.210
By education
Secondary 0.914 0.675 0.327 0.689 0.509 0.280
High school 0.567 0.469 0.223 0.428 0.354 0.198
University 0.427 0.375 0.180 0.331 0.291 0.158
By family composition
Single women with no children 0.532 0.486 0.159 0.419 0.383 0.055
Lone mothers 2.240 1.275 0.452 1.362 0.775 0.378
Women in couples, no children 0.264 0.242 0.163 0.220 0.203 0.167
Women in couples with children 0.688 0.522 0.316 0.553 0.419 0.304
Notes: Calculations based on simulated data under the 1999 tax and benefits system. The derivatives in columns 2 and 5 measure
the percentage point change in labor supply, in response to a 1% increase in net earnings. All effects are measured in the year the
change in earnings occurs.
Simulated wage elasticities of labor supply are presented in Table 14. Marshallian elasticities are
obtained by perturbing the entire profile of wages and comparing the outcome of the simulation
across the original and the new profile keeping education choices fixed; as such they account for
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wealth effects. The Frisch elasticities are responses to an anticipated change in the wage at one
age at a time and computing the effect at each age separately. Since the perturbation in the
latter case is very small there are no wealth effects; together with the anticipated nature of the
perturbation, this allows us to interpret the values in the first three columns of the Table as a
marginal utility of wealth constant or Frisch elasticities.
Frisch elasticities differ from Marshallian elasticities due to wealth effects, although with experience
dynamics there is no necessity for Frisch elasticities to be larger. We find that participation is
more elastic than hours, a result that is common in the empirical literature.44 Mothers are more
responsive to changes in net wages than women with no children, another typical result in the
empirical literature.45 Finally, secondary educated women are also much more responsive to
incentives, particularly on the intensive margin.





















Notes: Based on simulated data using the 1999 tax and benefit system.
The elasticities also vary with age as illustrated for both the Frisch and the Marshallian elasticities
in Figure 9. Their profile is strongly influenced by changes in family composition over the life-
cycle, which counteract the downward pressure on labor elasticities created by higher returns to
44See the survey of participation and hours elasticities in Meghir and Phillips (2010)
45See Blundell, Meghir and Neves (1993), or Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998).
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work at younger ages due to human capital accumulation (see Imai and Keane, 2004). They peak
when family formation and childrearing are most important – which happens at an increasing
age with education – and then fall gradually from then onwards. It is however notable that the
elasticities are always low for college graduates, and the Marshallian elasticities (as well as the
Frisch elasticities to a less extent) show the monotonically increasing pattern with age predicted in
labour supply models with human capital accumulation. The income elasticities on the extensive
margin are about -0.4 for all education groups and decline in absolute value with age to about
-0.3, with minimal variation across education groups.
7.4 The role of savings
Savings are an important margin of response to welfare reform if individuals adjust assets to achieve
the desired amount of self-insurance depending on the policy environment; this in turn will have
an effect both on predicted behavior and on the estimated welfare effects of a reform. To show how
behavioral responses can be distorted by ignoring assets, we re-estimated the model shutting down
any borrowing or savings and forcing people to live off their current income (including any welfare
payments).46 When we do this, the loss of fit is particularly pronounced for the proportions moving
in and out of work. One reason for this is that, in the absence of savings, employment becomes
the only way to smooth consumption. This distorts the accumulation of experience and the model
can no longer fit wage profiles as well as before, particularly for university graduates, for whom
both savings and experience are more important. For them, the simulated profiles overestimate
observed wage growth beyond age 40. For related reasons, the estimated Marshallian elasticities
are higher when we shut down savings. Particularly pronounced differences are for the extensive
margin Marshallian elasticities for single mothers and the intensive ones for single women with
no children. These are the two groups who are missing husband’s income, which can provide
some diversification and smoothing of shocks. A comparison of Marshallian elasticities with and
without savings is provided in appendix E.
46In particular, the model without savings does not include tuition fees or loans, and does not account for savings
towards retirement.
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Finally, some estimated models use a utility function that is linear in consumption, which makes
savings irrelevant. The insurance component of welfare benefits will not be valued by the risk
neutral individuals of these models. However, studies of consumption imply individuals are risk
averse (see for example, Blundell, Browning and Meghir, 1994). Ignoring this aspect would give
an incomplete picture of the role of welfare benefits and indeed taxes.
8 The Long Run Effects of Tax and Benefit Reforms
8.1 Tax Credits
We now turn to the longer run effects of tax credits and some aspects of their design in the UK.
These are impacts that can only be reasonably evaluated by a structural model that accounts
for the longer run effects of the dynamics, including changes in education choice and in the
accumulation of experience.
The main motivation for tax credits was to provide income support to low income mothers, while
preserving their labor market attachment and avoiding the erosion of their human capital during
the child-baring period. So how effective are they in achieving their aims? In what follows, we
discuss the simulated effects of two revenue neutral reforms allowing for responses on education,
employment, hours and savings. First we compare outcomes under the 2002 system, with the tax
credits are in place, to those that would occur had they been removed - we report the effect of
having tax credits, funded by increasing the basic rate of tax. Then we consider the effects of
assessing eligibility for the tax credits on personal rather than family income, thus integrating tax
credits to the individual based UK tax system. In the tables, individuals are classified based on
their pre-reform educational choice, to avoid composition effects in the comparisons.
Tax credits have a large positive effect on the employment of single mothers (Table 15, rows 1-3).
The effects are stronger for part-time employment as expected from their design, but are also
sizable even for full-time hours with the exception of University-educated mothers. On the other
hand, mothers with a partner decrease their labor supply: tax credits are assessed at the family
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Table 15: Effects of tax credits
Pre-reform education choice
Secondary High School University
Impact on Employment: Mothers of Dependent Children (0-18)
Single Married Single Married Single Married
(1) All (pp) 20.4 -6.6 19.9 -3.6 8.5 -1.0
(2) Full-time (pp) 09.3 -3.6 07.5 -2.4 -2.1 -1.1
(3) Part-time (pp) 11.1 -3.0 12.3 -1.2 10.6 0.1
Impact on Employment: Mothers of Adult Children (19+)
(4) All (pp) 0.4 0.3 0.0
(5) Full-time (pp) 0.4 -0.0 -0.2
(6) Part-time (pp) -0.0 0.3 0.2
Impact on Education and Wages
(7) Education (pp) 0.84 -0.19 -0.65
(8) Wages: mothers of child aged 19+ (%) -0.20 0.05 -0.29
Impact on Assets (%)
(9) no children -3.3 -2.1 -1.5
(10) dependent child (0-18) -7.2 -5.3 -2.6
(11) adult child (19+) -2.3 -1.7 -1.3
Impact on Lifetime Disposable Income and Welfare
(12) Disposable Income (%) -1.09 -0.25 -0.87
(13) Consumption equivalent (%) 2.49 0.89 -0.27
(14) Adjustment in the basic rate of Income Tax to fund reform: +0.9pp
Reform is revenue neutral by adjusting the income tax rate. Education is allowed to adjust. Educational classification fixed at the
pre-reform (no tax credits) choice. All effects are percentage points change (pp) or percent changes (%) as marked.
level and the family may receive the credit if the male partner is working; in such case, her earnings
reduce the overall family entitlement; hence tax credits are a work disincentive for mothers with
a partner. Finally, as expected we see a shift towards less educational attainment (row 7) since
tax credits reduce the return to education.47
However the remarkable result in this table is that the employment of women with adult children,
who are no longer entitled to benefits, remains unaffected by the introduction of the benefit (rows
4-6). It implies no long-run impact of tax credits on labor market attachment, beyond the time
they are eligible to receive it. The reason for this important result is that their wages, as of when
their children have grown, remain unchanged (row 8). To understand why, one must view the
impact on labor market experience from a life-cycle perspective: most single mothers are so for a
limited period, only in just over 50% of the cases for 5 years or more, and most children are born
to married mothers (about 70% among low-medium skilled women, and just under 85% among
47See also Keane and Wolpin, 2000 on this issue.
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University graduates). This implies that tax credits can have opposite effects on the same woman
over her life-time: when in a couple the incentive is to work less, which reduces the experience
capital; when a lone mother the incentive is to work more, but mainly part-time hours, which
helps avoiding depreciation but does not build experience. The net effect is that on average wages
remain the same by the time children have grown up.
The effects are heterogeneous. In Table 16 we focus on a small but important group: those who
brought up their children as lone mothers exclusively. When eligible for tax credits they work more
as per the above results. So when their child becomes an adult (19 years old) and they stop being
eligible for tax credits the accumulated experience increases their wage by 5.8% for the lowest
educated group, 3.3% for the high school group and not much for the university group, compared
to if no tax credits were ever available. This should incentivize them to work after the termination
of eligibility. However, tax-credits also have a wealth effect: when their youngest child reaches 19,
secondary educated women who raised their children as lone-mothers have accumulated 37% more
assets and high school graduates 9.5%. These are sizable effects on savings that counteract the
effect of experience, leading to a decrease in the employment rate of this group. The overall effect
on lifetime disposable income is positive – a combined effect of the transfer and the increased work
effort during child-rearing years.
Table 16: Effects of tax credits on mothers of 19 year olds who have always been a lone-mother
Secondary High School University
All employment when child is 19+ (pp) -0.9 -1.0 0.0
Part-time employment when child is 19+ (pp) 0.0 0.9 0.0
Full-time employment when child is 19+ (pp) -0.9 -1.9 0.0
Wages when child is 19 (%) 5.8 3.2 -0.2
Assets when child is 19 (%) 37.3 9.5 -0.4
Lifetime disposable income (%) 7.9 6.3 1.71
Education is allowed to adjust. Educational classification fixed at the pre-reform choice. All effects are percentage points change
(pp) or percent changes (%) as marked.
The inability of tax credits to cause longer term attachment to the labor market for lower education
groups – beyond the time where they are offered – is consistent with the results by Card and Hyslop
(2005). They found that the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Program, which provided incentives for
welfare mothers to work for a limited period, did not improve their employment after the program
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ended and did little to increase their wages.
Finally, tax credits lead to a decrease in savings in response to the increase in publicly provided
insurance (Table 15, rows 9-11). Despite the decrease in disposable income and an increase in
the basic tax rate of 0.9pp to fund the program (Table 15, rows 12 and 14), the overall welfare
gain following from this revenue neutral reform is equivalent to a 0.82% increase in consumption
overall. This shows the effects of increased insurance. From the table we see that most of this gain
is concentrated among the lowest education group, for whom disposable income also decreases the
most on average. 48
The opposing incentive effects produced by the UK tax credit system, depending on whether a
woman is married or not raises the question as to whether they should better be assessed based
on individual income, integrated with the regular individualized income tax system, or as they are
now, i.e. assessed on family income. Such a reform is potentially expensive because many women
married to well-payed partners will become entitled to the benefit, but it improves the incentive
structure and preserves the principle of individual taxation. We consider this reform, funded by
increasing the basic tax rate, and contrast it to the 2002 system where tax credits are assessed at
the family level.
The results are presented in Table 17. This reform increases the employment of married mothers
because her earnings no longer reduce family entitlement; indeed she has to work to obtain the
credit. However, in the new long run steady state single mothers work less. As before, this
response can only be understood in a dynamic context. The increased employment when married
reduces the human capital depreciation. However, tax credits in the UK are also effectively a
tax on full-time work, which declines substantially compared to baseline for the same group of
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where the index 0/1 stands for the pre/post-reform solutions and the value function is evaluated at different stages









Table 17: Effects of assessing tax credits at the individual level - integrated with the 2002 tax and
benefit system
Pre-reform education choice
Secondary High School University
Impact on Employment: Mothers of Dependent Children (0-18)
Single Married Single Married Single Married
(1) All (pp) -3.7 29.6 -4.3 21.6 -4.6 15.0
(2) Full-time (pp) -6.3 -16.2 -7.3 -19.2 -9.8 -18.0
(3) Part-time (pp) 2.6 45.8 3.0 40.7 5.2 33.1
Impact on Employment: Mothers of Adult Children (19+)
(4) All (pp) -2.8 -2.8 -3.7
(5) Full-time (pp) -8.7 -6.6 -7.3
(6) Part-time (pp) 4.1 2.9 1.4
Impact on Education and Wages
(7) Education (pp) 1.97 -0.82 1.15
(8) Wages for mothers of child aged 19+ (%) -3.7 -5.7 -5.9
Impact on Assets (%)
(9) no children -12.4 -11.5 -11.4
(10) dependent child (0-18) 21.3 8.3 -2.8
(11) adult child (19+) 6.8 0.0 -6.4
Impact on Lifetime Disposable Income and Welfare
(12) Disposable Income (%) 0.93 -3.43 -7.6
(13) Consumption equivalent (%) 0.64 -2.43 -1.0
(14) Adjustment in the basic rate of Income Tax to fund reform: +8.5pp
Reform is revenue neutral by adjusting the income tax rate. Education is allowed to adjust. Educational classification fixed at the
pre-reform choice. All effects are percentage points change (pp) or percent changes (%) as marked.
mothers (row 2, Table 17). Because of the part-time penalty on wages this leads to a counteracting
reduction in human capital accumulation, on average. Thus, the net effect is a decline in wages by
1.3% at the point when some become single mothers.49 The increased benefits while married also
increases saving, so that when women become lone mothers their assets are up by 18% relative
to baseline.50 In addition, the tax rate has increased substantially to fund this reform (row 14,
table 17). The combined effects of the resulting lower net wages and increased savings produces
the decline in employment for single mothers. By the time they are no longer eligible for benefits
because their children are grown, their wages have declined substantially (see row 8, Table 17),
taxes are higher and assets for the lowest education group remain 6.8% higher than at baseline;
as a result they continue having lower employment relative to the case of family assessed benefits,
49The effect on wages is larger for university graduates (-2.4%) than for secondary and high-school educated
women (-0.2% and -1.7%, respectively). This is because the former have higher returns to experience.
50The corresponding effects on assets by education are +30%, +16% and +6% for secondary, high-school and
university graduates, respectively.
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given the current design.
The reform also discourages education and leads to a decline in post-compulsory schooling of nearly
2 percentage points. Overall, lifetime disposable income declines for all but the lowest education
group driven also by the large increase in taxation required to fund this new system. The end result
from individualising tax credits is an overall decline in welfare equivalent to 8.3% of consumption,
with only the lowest education group being better off, in part because of redistribution but also
from increased insurance. Thus ignoring family income when defining eligibility for benefits can
be very costly and lead to unintended effects on incentives in the longer run.
8.2 Comparing alternative policies
Broadly speaking the model we have developed here can be the basis for an optimal design of taxes
and benefits in a dynamic economy with education choice as analyzed for example by Stantcheva
(2015). While this is an ambitious and interesting exercise it is beyond the scope of this paper.
Here we consider how local departures from the existing system are likely to affect welfare. The
result will depend on the interplay between work incentives and preferences for insurance and
income. To illustrate the extent of insurance implicit in the current system, which is the point of
departure, we show in Figure 10 the amount of life-cycle consumption that an individual is willing
to give up (positive or negative) to keep the status quo, as a function of changes in the variance of
wages. Women with the lowest level of education are the least sensitive to changes in risk, which
reflects the relatively high level of insurance already offered to those at the lower end of the pay
distribution. The other two groups seem less well insured and they value declines in risk much
more and to a similar extent.
We now consider the welfare implications of expanding tax credits further, as opposed to increasing
the income support program or cutting taxes. To do this we implement changes to each on the
2002 tax and benefit system, all costing 0.5% of baseline pre-tax earnings.
We allow for responses in education, labour supply and savings. The clear winner among the
programs are tax credits, where on average individuals are willing to pay 1.09% of consumption
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variance of innovations in female wage rates
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Notes: Based on simulated data under the 2002 tax and benefit system. The vertical axis is the percentage of consumption one is
willing to give up to move from the actual variance (marked as 1) to a proportionate change as per the horizontal axis. Consumption
compensation calculated at start of working life, after education.
Table 18: Impacts of an exogenous increase in public spending distributed through alternative
routes
Basic tax rate Tax credits award Income support award
Effects by pre-reform education choice
Sec HS Univ Sec HS Univ Sec HS Univ
(1) Lifetime gross earnings 0.19 0.13 0.10 -0.21 -0.33 -0.56 -1.28 -1.25 -0.88
(2) Lifetime disposable income 0.68 0.77 0.88 0.84 0.36 -0.24 -0.15 -0.48 -0.54
(3) Welfare (post-education) 0.48 0.63 0.45 1.38 0.78 0.77 0.72 0.32 0.30
Overall effects on welfare
(4) Pre-education 0.80 1.09 0.51
Notes: % changes. Educational classification is based on pre-reform choices. Welfare, measured in % consumption change to which
it is equivalent. The values measure the impact of exogenously increasing public spending by 0.5% of total gross earnings and
distributing it through a drop in the basic tax rate of 0.95 percentage points, an increase in the tax credits maximum award of
£22.2 per week and an increase in the IS award of £10.0 per week. All comparisons are against the 2002 tax and benefits system.
for the additional benefit (row 4). The second preferred alternative is a tax cut with a willingness
to pay of 0.80% of consumption. This is despite the fact that both gross and disposable incomes
are higher following a tax cut and can be partly attributed to the better targeted insurance of
tax credits (rows 1 and 2). Tax cuts is also the only policy that improves the incentives to
invest in education, but the effect is small with the share of university graduates increasing by 0.1
percentage points. The least preferred program is income support, with a willingness to pay of
0.51%: while it offers good insurance at the bottom, it is associated with a large decline in gross
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and disposable income. Thus, in all cases the distortionary nature of income support, with its
100% marginal tax rate, makes it the least preferable program despite its basic insurance property
(it provides a strong income floor).
All education groups prefer the tax credits changes (row 3). This is true even for university
graduates, who lose 0.2% of their disposable income under tax credits due to a shift towards lower
education (row 2). The second best option for both university and high-school educated women
in tax cuts. But secondary educated women prefer an increase in income support to tax cuts as
their generally lower earnings make them less likely to benefit from a lower tax rate.
9 Conclusions
Tax and welfare policies that affect employment decisions may change individual careers by af-
fecting the accumulation of human capital, including education decisions, as well as savings.
Evaluating such policies requires us to take these features into account, ultimately informing the
design of policies that are welfare improving.
In this paper we use reforms to the tax and welfare system and the way they impact different
demographic groups to establish that they cause changes in both labor supply and educational
decisions. We then develop a dynamic life-cycle model of women’s labor supply, human capital
formation (including both education choice and work experience) and savings. We estimate this
model on a long household panel from the UK and we use numerous tax and welfare reforms as
a source of exogenous variation. We pay particular attention to the detailed modeling of the tax
and welfare system and the way it was reformed.
Using the model we estimate Frisch and Marshallian labor supply elasticities, both at the extensive
and the intensive margin (part-time versus full-time) and we show how they vary over the life-
cycle and by household structure. Elasticities are generally high, but below one, except for single
mothers with pre-school children, where they exceed one, underlying the strong responses of this
group to work incentives.
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We then use the model to evaluate the overall impact of the UK tax credits implemented under the
1999-2002 WFTC reform. A key substantive result is that tax credits, while inducing many low
education mothers into work, do not affect their wages and employment in the long term, beyond
the time they receive the subsidy. In part this is because their design encourages part-time work,
which we demonstrate has low value in terms of human capital accumulation. It is also due to
the low return to experience that we find for lower education women. Tax credits also discourage
educational attainment. However, they are the preferred way of providing some insurance because
the moral hazard element is low due to the built in work incentive. This is to be contrasted with
income support, with an associated 100% marginal tax rate, which has a strong moral hazard
effect and is thus less effective in improving overall welfare.
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Web Appendix A: Data
Estimation is based on all 18 yearly waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), covering
the period from 1991 to 2008. Apart from those who are lost through attrition, all families in
the original 1991 sample and subsequent booster samples remain in the panel from then onwards.
Other individuals have been added to the sample in subsequent periods – sometimes temporarily
– as they formed families with original interviewees or were born to them. All members of the
household aged 16 and above are interviewed.
We select the sample of women in all types of family arrangement observed while aged 19 to
50. Our full dataset is an unbalanced panel of 3,901 women observed for some varying period
during the years 1991 to 2008. Almost 60% of these women were observed for at least 5 years and
just over 20% were observed for at least 10 years; 25% are observed entering working life from
education and for 18% parental earnings when the respondent was aged 16-17 is observed. A great
deal of information is collected for them, including family demographics, employment, working
hours and earnings as well as those of a present partner, women’s demographics such as age and
education, demand for childcare and its cost. Moreover, historical data provides information on
the characteristics of their parental home when they were aged 16, including whether lived with
parents, parent’s education, employment status, number of siblings and sibling order, books at
home.
Some definitional and data preparation procedures should be mentioned for clarity. Employment
is determined by present labor-market status and excludes self-employment. The paths of women
who report being self-employed are deleted from that moment onwards. Only women working 5
or more hours per week are classified as employed. We consider employment choices from the age
of 19 for women with secondary and high school education, and from the age of 22 for women
with university education.
Working hours refer to the usual hours in main job including overtime. We discretised labour
supply using a three-point distribution: not working (0 to 4 hours per week, modelled as 0 hours),
working part-time (5 to 20 hours per week, modelled as 18 hours) and working full-time (21 hours
or more per week, modelled as 38 hours). The employment status and working hours observed at
one point in the year are assumed to remain unaltered over the entire year.
Earnings are the usual gross weekly earnings in the main job. (Hourly) wage rates are the ratio
of weekly earnings to weekly hours capped at 70. The wage distribution is trimmed at percentiles
2 and 99 from below and above, respectively, and only for women working at or above 5 hours per
week to reduce the severity of measurement error in wage rates.
Wage rates are de-trended using the aggregate wage index (for both men and women of all edu-
cation levels), and all other monetary parameters in the model, including all monetary values in
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the annual sequence of tax and benefit systems, were deflated using the same index. To construct
this index, we run 3 regressions, one for each education level, of trimmed wages on time dum-
mies and dummies of Scotland and Wales. We create 3 education specific wage indices from the
coefficients in time. Then we aggregate these indices using the distribution of education for the
entire population of workers aged 25-59 in the sample. This is the wage index we use. Any real
monetary values (using the CPI) are then re-scaled using this index.
Family type includes four groups: single women and couples without children, lone mothers and
couples with children. Women are assumed to have children only after finishing education, once
entering the labor market. Cumulated work experience is measured in years. Individual assets
at the beginning of adult life are the total of savings and investments net of debts. They are
truncated at zero, never allowed to be negative. Education is classified in 3 categories: secondary
or compulsory (completed by the age of 16), high school or equivalent (corresponding to A-levels
or equivalent qualifications) and university (3-year degrees and above).
Web Appendix B: Parameters estimated outside the struc-
tural model
Externally set parameters
Two parameters are chosen from pre-existing estimates: the coefficient, µ, set to -0.56, giving
a risk aversion coefficient of 1.56 (consistent with evidence in Blundell, Browning and Meghir,
1994, and Attanasio and Weber, 1995). This choice implies that the utility is always negative,
and so the higher is the argument in the exponential - U in equation (1) - the lower is overall
utility. Hence, positive and larger values of the parameters in U make working less attractive.
The discount factor, β, is set to 0.98, a typical value in the literature (see e.g. Attanasio, Low and
Sanchez-Marcos, 2008). Moreover, the risk-free interest rate is set to 0.015, which is slightly lower
than the discount rate thus implying that agents have some degree of impatience. Tuition costs
of university education amount to £3,000 (uprated to 2008 prices) for the three-year program
and the credit limit for university students (and graduates throughout their life) is £5,000 (also
uprated to 2008 prices), both reflecting the university education policy of the late 1990s in the
UK. For everyone else, credit is constrained.
Family transitions
Family transition probabilities were estimated using linear probability regressions, weighted to
ensure an equal number of women at each age.
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Notes: Distribution of family types by age of woman. Data in solid lines, simulations in dashed lines.
The probability of a partner arriving is estimated by regressing a dummy for partner arrival on a
fourth order polynomial in female age among single women aged 55 or less. This is done separately
for each of the nine combinations of female and partner education level. Arrival probabilities in
the first period of working life are taken directly from the data, and are set to zero after 55.
The probability of a partner leaving is also described by a fourth order polynomial in female age,
estimated on all women aged 20–69. This is done separately by spouses’ education and presence
of children.
The probability of a child arriving is estimated by regressing a dummy for child arrival on a second
order polynomial in female age and, for families with children, a second order polynomial in age
of next youngest child and a linear interaction with female age. This is done separately for each
female education level and by couple status. The probability of a child arriving is set to zero from
when the woman reaches 43 onwards.
Figure 11 shows the distribution of family composition by female age and education for both
observed data and model simulations. The displayed simulated profiles are reasonably close to
the observed data ones. They show that secondary educated women are more likely to become
mothers early on and to experienced lone-motherhood than high school and university graduates.
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Male employment and earnings
Table 19 reports the estimates for male working status and earnings by his education. This is
relevant only for women in couples as we do not seek to solve the men’s problem. However, the
partner’s employment and income changes the family budget constraint and the work incentives
of women in couples.
Rows 1 to 3 display estimates from a probit regression and show that the employment probability
generally increases with education and is very persistent (row 3). Estimates for the log wage
equation suggest only mild differences in wage rates by education (row 4) but strong differences in
wage progression, with more educated men experiencing steeper wage profiles over time (row 5).
We set the autocorrelation coefficient in the male productivity process to 0.99, close to a unit root.
Having tried several alternative exclusion restrictions within a Heckman (1979) selection model of
male employment and earnings, we found no evidence of statistically significant selection. Hence,
we assume that the residuals in the employment and wage equations are uncorrelated.




(1) new couples 0.74 0.87 0.83
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
(2) ongoing couples: intercept 0.05 0.37 0.58
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
(3) ongoing couples: previously employed 1.52 1.40 1.28
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Log wage equation
(4) log wage rates 1.94 2.07 2.05
(0.07) (0.08) (0.15)
(5) log woman’s age minus 18 0.09 0.18 0.35
(0.04) (0.03) (0.07)
(6) St. Deviation of innovation to productivity 0.37 0.36 0.39
(new couples) (0.12) (0.13) (0.18)
(7) St. Deviation of innovation to productivity 0.12 0.10 0.10
(ongoing couples) (0.04) (0.03) (0.5)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis below the estimate. Sample sizes are: 665 observations for new couples, 31,946 observations
for all couples and 16,318 for continuously employed men.
Families with positive childcare costs pay £2.60 (standard error 0.04) per working hour. Childcare
is required for every hour when all adults in the household are working if the child is 5 or younger,
and is only necessary for older children under the age of 10 if all adults work full-time.
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Web Appendix C: Computational details on the solution
and estimation of the model
The estimation and simulation exercises require the solution of the female life-cycle model. Since
there is no analytical solution to the problem, we approximate numerically the policy functions
for labour supply, consumption and education choices conditionally on the woman’s information
at each period of her life (the state variables, described by X at the start of section 4.2). We do
this by backward recursion, starting from the end of life (age 70).
A key feature of our model is that it models the joint consumption and labour supply decisions
over the working years of women, where the former is a continuous choice while the latter is
discrete. The numerical solution of problems with simultaneous discrete and continuous choices is
considerably harder than that of problems with only continuous or only discrete choices, explaining
the limited existing work on such models. Some studies (e.g. French and Jones, 2011; Adda,
Dustmann and Stevens, 2015) have opted for discretising the space of the continuous choice.
More recently, solution methods to handle discrete and continuous choices have been proposed
by Fella, 2014, and Iskhakov et al., 2015. Our solution method is close but not identical to the
methods advanced by these two papers, and hence we describe it here.
The main difficulty in solving dynamic problems that combine discrete and continuous choices is
that the smoothness and concavity of the value function that is typical of continuous problems
– and that ensures the existence and uniqueness of a solution that is itself continuous and, if
interior, is the root of the optimality condition (Euler equation) – does not hold in a problem with
a discrete choice variable. The addition of a discrete choice makes the value function piecewise
concave, with kinks falling at the points where the agent is indifferent between any two possible
alternatives along the discrete choice domain; these then translate into discontinuities in the
optimal choice of the continuous variable (consumption or savings).
Kinks created by present choices at time t – what Iskhakov et al. (2015) call primary kinks – do
not pose difficulties. They can be dealt with by conditioning the continuous choice on the discrete
choice in a first step, followed by the choice of the alternative with highest value in the second
step. This is computationally more demanding than the purely continuous problem because the
root of the Euler equation must be calculated for each point in the domain of the discrete choice,
but the solution method is a trivial extension of that for a purely continuous problem.
However, kinks propagate backwards through the (expected) continuation values - the secondary
kinks. These are caused by indifference points in future choices, from t + 1 onwards, and hence
cannot be easily conditioned on. The further back one moves, the more kinks there will be.
Furthermore, associated with secondary kinks are discontinuities in future choices, which need to
be accounted for in the Euler equation as they affect the marginal utility of the continuous choice
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variable at both time t and t + 1. This implies that the Euler equation is no longer a sufficient
optimality condition, even after conditioning on the discrete choice at time t.
As noticed by Iskhakov et al. (2015) and others before them (e.g. Gomes et al., 2001), kinks can
be eliminated and the expected continuation value can be ‘concavified’ by uncertainty. This is the
approach we explore given the rich characterisation of uncertainty we account for in the model.
In our problem, the kinks in the value function occur at the level of assets where the woman is
indifferent between working full-time / part-time / not working, or at points in assets that lead
optimally to indifference points in the future (all conditional on her present state). To see why,




{Vt(Xt | lt = O), Vt(Xt | lt = P ), Vt(Xt | lt = F )} (14)
where
Vt(Xt | lt = l) = max
ct∈C(Xt,l)
{u (ct, l;Xt) + βE [Vt+1(Xt+1) | Xt, l]} (15)
L(X) represents the feasibility space for labour supply l given X and C(X, l) is the feasibility
space for consumption c given (X, l). In the above expression, the expectation in the continuation
value is taken with respect to the transition probability in a subset of variables in X: the woman’s
productivity shock (υ), the arrival of a new child (tk changing to zero), the formation or dissolution
of a marriage (m), the education of a new spouse (s̃), and the employment and productivity of a
present spouse (l̃, υ̃).
We are concerned with kinks in EVt+1. Clearly, for as long as the transition function for
(
υ, tk,m, s̃, l̃, υ̃
)
is non-degenerate and the kinks at t + 1 vary with these variables, their presence will dilute the
kinks in EVt+1. Whether it is sufficient to ‘concavify’ the expected value function is a practical
question. Using a fine grid of 50 points in assets, we inspect the concavity of our numerical ap-
proximation of the expected value function. This is a finer grid than we use to solve and estimate
the model; it is used here with the purpose of finding non-concavities that could have been missed
with a coarser grid. Figure 12 shows some examples of the profile of the expected value functions
for different age groups. We have exhaustively inspected the value function at other points in the
state space based both on the finer grid in assets used here and the coarser grid used for estimation
and simulation. We found no evidence at the estimated parameterisation, that the expected value
function is not globally concave.
Given a set of parameters and the solution of the female problem at time t + 1, the critical step
in the solution at time t is to calculate the optimal level of consumption (or, equivalently, next
period assets) at each possible realization of the labor supply choice (l). This amounts to solving
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Notes: Lines are numerical approximations of the value functions at selected age and family demographics by assets. Plots are
for women of type I in utility cost of work, low background factors 1 and 2, with compulsory education only and at their average
productivity level, the age of the youngest child is 10 for mothers, and the spouses of women in couples have completed compulsory
education only and are working at their average productivity.
for the root of the Euler equation
ct (Xt; lt) = (u
′
l)





P (lt+1 | Xt, lt) E [u′ (ct+1(Xt+1)) | Xt, ct, lt]

where the (u′l)
−1 is the analytical inverse of the utility function with respect to consumption
conditional on labour supply l, and is evaluated at the expected marginal utility of consumption
at t+ 1, a function of the state variables at t+ 1. The expectations are conditional on information
and choices at t.
A couple of comments are due at this stage. First, for a standard dynamic problem with continuous
choice and a twice continuously differentiable and concave utility function, the policy function is
monotonic in assets and there is a single solution to the above equation. This can be quickly
located by searching for the point in consumption at which the difference between rhs and lhs of
equation (16) changes sign. Fella (2014) shows that the monotonicity result extends to dynamic
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Figure 13: Inverse marginal utility applied to the expected marginal utility function; by age,
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Notes: Lines are numerical approximations of the functions at selected age and family demographics by assets. Plots are for women
of type I in utility cost of work, low background factors 1 and 2, with compulsory education only and at their average productivity
level, the age of the youngest child is 10 for mothers, and the spouses of women in couples have completed compulsory education
only and are working at their average productivity.
problems with discrete and continuous choice away from kinks since the value function is concave
between any two consecutive kinks. Hence, there is at most a single interior solution within each
concave section of the value function, which needs to be calculated so the global optimum can
be determined. While Figure 12 above shows that, in our problem and for the estimated set
of parameters, the expected value function is globally concave – ensuring that condition (16) is
sufficient for an interior optimum – we do check for multiple roots during estimation since global
concavity may not hold over the entire parameter space.
Second, although our solution approach to the approximation of the optimal consumption function
is in the spirit of Carroll’s Endogenous Grid Point method (Carroll, 2006), we do not follow his
strategy of endogenously selecting a grid for assets at time t by solving equation (16) backwards
having set a grid for assets at t + 1. Instead, we follow the traditional approach of selecting a
fixed grid in assets at time t and solve for the optimal consumption (or assets at t + 1). This is
facilitated by the observation that the rhs of (16) is nearly linear in assets at t+1 (or consumption
at t) over most of its space. This is shown in Figure 13. We therefore use linear interpolation to
solve the Euler equation on a grid of assets that is finer towards the lower bound of its domain,
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where the problem is more non-linear.
The following algorithm describes the solution procedure at time t, given the expected value and
marginal utility functions at time t+ 1. For convenience, we split the state variables in two sets,
depending on whether their realisation is known or not from the view point of the previous period,
conditional on choice. So Xt = (Ωt, ωt) where Ω = (θ, x1, x2, s, at, et) is known by the woman at




t ,mt, s̃t, l̃t, υ̃
)
is uncertain. The goal is to compute
the expected value function (EVt) and the expected marginal utility function evaluated at the
optimal choices (Eu′t), where expectations are taken at t− 1. Ωt is known at t− 1 conditional on
the choices at that time but ωt is not and needs to be integrated out. Hence, EVt and Eu
′
t are
functions of (Ωt, ωt−1).
Inputs These include:
1. Numerical approximations of the expected value function and the expected marginal utility
of consumption evaluated at the optimal choices at t+ 1. These are functions of (Ωt+1, ωt):
EVt+1 (Ωt+1, ωt) and Eu
′
t+1 (Ωt+1, ωt).
2. Grids for all pre-determined continuous variables at t: assets, experience (at, et).
51 The
support of the discrete state variables (including the woman’s family background, educa-
tion, and preferences for working, whether children are present and the age of the youngest,
whether she faces childcare costs as a mother of a young child, the presence of a partner
his education and employment status) is fully represented in the solution.
3. Grids for the random productivity shocks for the woman and present partner at time
t, (υt, υ̃t).
52 The grid points in the productivity shocks are the mid points (median) of
the equal probability adjacent intervals of their entire support and hence the quadrature
weights are constant.
Step 1 Approximate the policy function for consumption conditional on labour supply.
For each grid point of female characteristics (family background (x1, x2), preference type θ,
education s, working experience e and productivity level υ), family demographics (children k,
age of youngest child tk, partner m) and the characteristics of a present partner (education s̃,
employment status l̃ and productivity υ̃):
1. Compute total family resources after taxes and benefits, call it It;
2. Compute next period experience, et+1;
3. Interpolate Eu′t+1 (Ωt+1, ωt) at et+1;
51We use a grid of 6 points in each of the variables (a, e). The grid points in assets and experience are more
concentrated towards the bottom of the domain of each variable, where the problem is more non-linear.
52We use a grid of 6 points in υ̃ and of 12 points in υ to ensure that the domain of uncertainty in female wages,
a key determinant of labor supply, is well covered.
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4. Compute ct (Xt; lt) that solves equation (16) by linear interpolation of (u
′
l)
−1 (Eu′t+1 (Ωt+1, ωt))
at at+1 = It − ct (Xt; lt);
5. Calculate Vt (Xt; lt = l) as in equation (15) by interpolating EVt+1 (Ωt+1, ωt) at at+1 =
It − ct (Xt; lt).
Step 2 Compute the unconditional optimum:
1. Compute optimal labour supply by selecting the value of l that maximises Vt (Xt; l);
2. Store the value function Vt (Xt) and the marginal utility of consumption evaluated at the
optimal choice, u′ (Xt).
Step 3 Calculate the expected value and marginal utility functions at time t as functions of
(Ωt, ωt−1):
1. For each point in the grid of (υt−1, υ̃t−1): integrate Vt (Xt) and u
′ (Xt) over the distribution
of productivity shocks (υt, υ̃t) conditional on (υt−1, υ̃t−1);
2. For each possible family type and spouse’s employment status at t − 1: integrate the
resulting functions over the family transition rule and the employment probability of a
present spouse.
Outputs Period t expected functions EVt (Ωt, ωt−1) and Eu
′
t (Ωt, ωt−1).
Simulations are based on initial conditions for family background and parental income observed
in the data, together with random draws of the entire profile of unobserved shocks. Given this
information, individual optimal choices are calculated starting from the beginning of active life,
age 17, and moving forward. As for the solution, the optimum is computed at each age in two
steps, first by solving the Euler equation to calculate optimal savings at each labor supply point,
then by selecting the labor supply that achieves maximum total utility. In doing so, however,
the problem must now be evaluated outside the grid chosen for solution. In practice, this means
that the continuation functions need to be interpolated over up to four dimensions: future assets
and experience as before, along with present productivity shocks (for both spouses if women are
married). We do this by linear interpolation.
The estimation procedure is implemented in two steps. The first step estimates all the exoge-
nous parts of the model, including the dynamics of family formation (marriage, divorce, fertility,
male labor supply and earnings, and the cost of childcare). In addition, two parameters are
exogenously set: the coefficient of risk aversion and the discount rate.
The second step implements an iterative procedure to estimate the preferences and wages of
women within the structural model. In each iteration, we start by solving the female life-cycle
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problem for a particular set of the estimating parameters, given the economic environment and
the exogenously set parameters. We then simulate 5 replications of the life-cycle choices of 3,901
women observed in the data, conditional on observed family background and parental income.
The same sequences of lifetime shocks are used in all iterations of the estimation procedure to
avoid changes in the criterion function due to changes in the random draws. For each woman, we
select an observation window such that the overall simulated sample exactly reproduces the time
and age structure of the observed data. The simulations assume women face up to four policy
regimes over the observation window, representing the main tax and benefits systems operating
during the 1991-2008 period. We used the 1995, 1999, 2002 and 2004 regimes and assumed they
operate over the periods prior to 1996, 1997 to 1999, 2000 to 2002 and 2003 onwards, respectively.
Women into their active life over the entire period will experience all of these regimes at different
stages of their lives. Younger and older women, who either enter or leave active life within our
observation window, will experience only some of these policy regimes during the life period that
we are modelling. We assume that women expect the tax and benefit system they face in each
period to be permanent, so all reforms arrive unexpectedly. Finally, we calculate the simulated
moments using the simulated dataset and the objective function. We use 248 moments to estimate
89 parameters.
The parameters are selected to minimise the distance between sample and simulated moments,
where the weighting matrix is the inverse variance-covariance matrix of the data moments as
described in equation (13) in the main text. The procedure described above calculates the value
of the criterion function in each iteration of the optimization routine. Given the discrete choice of
labor supply, our criterion may not be a smooth function of the model parameters everywhere in
their domain (McFadden, 1989). We therefore use an optimisation routine that does not rely on
derivatives. Specifically, we choose to use the Bound Optimization By Quadratic Approximation,
which generates, in each iteration, a quadratic approximation of the criterion function that matches
the criterion in a set of interpolation points (see Powell, 2009; implementation by Nag).
Web Appendix D: Model fit
Tables 20 to 30 display the full list of data moments used in estimation, together with their
simulated counterparts and the normalized (by the data standard error) differences between the
two. The estimation procedure was based on 248 moments, including education distribution and
regressions (tables 20 and 21), employment rates (table 22), transition rates into and out of work
(tables 23 and 24), coefficients from log wage regressions, percentiles of the distribution of log wages
and year-to-year changes in wage rates by past working hours, age and years of work (tables 25 to
29), and the probability of positive childcare costs (table 30). All moments are education-specific.
Among the 254 simulated moments, 44 fall outside the 95% confidence interval for the respective
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data moment, but many amongst these are very similar to their BHPS counterparts.
Table 20: Educational distribution
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Secondary education
all 0.248 0.251 0.020 0.108
low background factor 1 0.411 0.411 0.046 0.000
high background factor 1 0.196 0.199 0.021 0.140
low background factor 2 0.284 0.295 0.029 0.382
high background factor 2 0.206 0.197 0.027 0.316
High School
all 0.481 0.482 0.023 0.038
low background factor 1 0.473 0.459 0.047 0.303
high background factor 1 0.484 0.490 0.027 0.217
low background factor 2 0.524 0.523 0.032 0.025
high background factor 2 0.431 0.433 0.034 0.083
University
all 0.270 0.267 0.021 0.147
low background factor 1 0.116 0.130 0.031 0.463
high background factor 1 0.320 0.311 0.025 0.352
low background factor 2 0.192 0.182 0.025 0.409
high background factor 2 0.364 0.369 0.033 0.174
Table 21: Education regressions
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
High School
constant 0.476 0.473 0.034 0.072
cohort 82+ -0.013 -0.012 0.055 0.034
background factor 1 0.009 0.012 0.020 0.140
background factor 2 -0.042 -0.038 0.016 0.236
cohort 82+ x factor 1 -0.010 -0.008 0.031 0.059
cohort 82+ x factor 2 -0.005 -0.017 0.026 0.426
log parental income -0.010 -0.021 0.051 0.222
University
constant 0.192 0.198 0.021 0.263
cohort 82+ 0.018 -0.014 0.037 0.884
background factor 1 0.076 0.077 0.012 0.087
background factor 2 0.067 0.071 0.012 0.305
cohort 82+ x factor 1 0.004 -0.001 0.024 0.222
cohort 82+ x factor 2 -0.038 0.012 0.022 2.200






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 23: Transition rates from out of work into work
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Secondary education
all 0.180 0.210 0.009 3.194
women with no children 0.272 0.321 0.036 1.339
lone mothers 0.114 0.133 0.016 1.223
married mothers 0.183 0.209 0.011 2.226
High school
all 0.255 0.236 0.016 1.132
women with no children 0.503 0.333 0.050 3.409
lone mothers 0.186 0.189 0.037 0.084
married mothers 0.210 0.224 0.017 0.814
University
all 0.276 0.221 0.031 1.771
women with no children 0.585 0.326 0.059 4.381
lone mothers 0.294 0.167 0.082 1.545
married mothers 0.188 0.191 0.029 0.120
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Table 24: Mean transition rates from employment to out of work
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Secondary education
all 0.064 0.071 0.004 1.914
women with no children 0.032 0.042 0.004 2.552
lone mothers 0.146 0.164 0.019 0.920
married mothers 0.085 0.085 0.006 0.137
past wage in bottom decile (wt−1 < Q10) 0.111 0.121 0.011 0.903
wt−1 < Q50 0.072 0.083 0.005 2.205
wt−1 < Q90 0.063 0.072 0.004 2.420
High school
all 0.056 0.052 0.004 1.027
women with no children 0.030 0.025 0.004 1.538
lone mothers 0.092 0.103 0.019 0.574
married mothers 0.086 0.078 0.008 0.999
wt−1 < Q10 0.135 0.111 0.018 1.397
wt−1 < Q50 0.079 0.074 0.007 0.730
wt−1 < Q90 0.056 0.055 0.004 0.089
University
all 0.040 0.035 0.005 0.995
women with no children 0.026 0.020 0.005 1.202
lone mothers 0.037 0.072 0.022 1.598
married mothers 0.061 0.056 0.009 0.500
wt−1 < Q10 0.077 0.114 0.036 1.004
wt−1 < Q50 0.079 0.071 0.014 0.590
wt−1 < Q90 0.044 0.043 0.006 0.213
68
Table 25: Log wages (lnw) at entrance in working life
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Secondary education
mean 1.806 1.764 0.019 2.153
variance 0.072 0.077 0.007 0.694
mean: high factor 1 1.840 1.764 0.023 3.298
mean: high factor 2 1.823 1.767 0.033 1.733
wage: bottom quartile (wt < Q25)) 0.249 0.271 0.031 0.715
wt < Q50 0.503 0.585 0.037 2.237
wt < Q75 0.751 0.782 0.031 1.008
High school
mean 1.825 1.862 0.018 2.023
variance 0.094 0.110 0.007 2.401
mean: high factor 1 1.825 1.875 0.022 2.321
mean: high factor 2 1.816 1.889 0.030 2.410
wage: bottom quartile (wt < Q25)) 0.250 0.213 0.025 1.480
wt < Q50 0.500 0.456 0.029 1.506
wt < Q75 0.750 0.704 0.026 1.783
University
mean 2.095 2.068 0.025 1.039
variance 0.118 0.128 0.011 0.884
mean: high factor 1 2.088 2.059 0.027 1.091
mean: high factor 2 2.121 2.049 0.034 2.123
wage: bottom quartile (wt < Q25)) 0.247 0.290 0.032 1.351
wt < Q50 0.500 0.492 0.038 0.226
wt < Q75 0.753 0.775 0.032 0.685
Notes: Statistics in this table are for 19 to 22 years old women in the two lowest education levels, or 22 to
25 years old university graduates.
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Table 26: Log wage (lnw) regressions on cumulated experience and lagged wages
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Secondary education
constant 0.433 0.444 0.039 0.290
family bkg: factor 1 0.029 0.029 0.007 0.116
family bkg: factor 2 -0.006 0.001 0.007 1.067
lnwt−1 0.745 0.742 0.015 0.186
log cumulated working years 0.073 0.145 0.073 0.986
lagged log cumulated working years -0.040 -0.117 0.064 1.212
Variance of residuals 0.050 0.053 0.002 1.294
1st order autocorrelation of residuals -0.010 -0.010 0.001 0.389
High school
constant 0.374 0.345 0.032 0.907
family bkg: factor 1 0.010 0.011 0.007 0.155
family bkg: factor 2 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.946
lnw 0.799 0.810 0.011 1.006
log cumulated working years 0.188 0.191 0.059 0.062
lagged log cumulated working years -0.151 -0.162 0.050 0.225
Variance of residuals 0.050 0.053 0.002 1.401
1st order autocorrelation of residuals -0.010 -0.010 0.001 0.570
University
constant 0.606 0.565 0.056 0.736
family bkg: factor 1 -0.009 0.006 0.011 1.429
family bkg: factor 2 0.001 -0.006 0.009 0.722
lnwt−1 0.760 0.754 0.020 0.340
log cumulated working years 0.088 0.185 0.066 1.461
lagged log cumulated working years -0.069 -0.156 0.056 1.561
Variance of residuals 0.043 0.046 0.002 1.162
1st order autocorrelation of residuals -0.007 -0.008 0.001 0.914
Table 27: Log wage (lnw) regressions on age
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Secondary education
constant 1.819 1.818 0.035 0.038
family bkg: factor 1 0.090 0.079 0.019 0.597
family bkg: factor 2 -0.020 0.003 0.019 1.204
age 0.051 0.049 0.008 0.249
High school
constant 1.721 1.834 0.042 2.694
family bkg: factor 1 0.052 0.043 0.023 0.366
family bkg: factor 2 0.016 0.026 0.021 0.497
age 0.149 0.110 0.011 3.669
University
constant 2.078 2.072 0.074 0.079
family bkg: factor 1 -0.022 0.009 0.036 0.881
family bkg: factor 2 -0.010 -0.034 0.028 0.859















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 29: Other moments in log wages
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Mean earnings by family background
Secondary education, high factor 1 2.073 2.069 0.014 0.261
Secondary education, high factor 2 2.020 2.018 0.013 0.152
High school, high factor 1 2.251 2.247 0.014 0.315
High school, high factor 2 2.278 2.272 0.015 0.373
University, high factor 1 2.525 2.539 0.015 0.910
University, high factor 2 2.530 2.543 0.018 0.748
Coefficients from regression of log wages on log experience, 1st differences
Secondary education 0.111 0.166 0.021 2.602
High school 0.197 0.226 0.016 1.810
University 0.230 0.267 0.021 1.743
Mean yearly change in log wages if working full-time at t− 1
Secondary education 0.024 0.016 0.002 3.603
High school 0.036 0.022 0.002 5.725
University 0.040 0.028 0.003 3.869
Mean yearly change in log wages if working part-time time at t− 1
Secondary education -0.003 0.012 0.005 3.042
High school -0.011 0.013 0.006 3.767
University 0.011 0.014 0.011 0.255
Mean yearly change in log wages if not working at t− 1
Secondary education 0.001 -0.002 0.010 0.349
High school -0.003 -0.002 0.012 0.047
University -0.019 0.001 0.023 0.908
Notes: Experience in the second panel from top is number of years worked in the past.
Table 30: Positive childcare costs costs among working mothers of children 10 or younger
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Secondary education 0.250 0.325 0.014 5.262
High school 0.396 0.403 0.017 0.355
University 0.631 0.462 0.025 6.760
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Web Appendix E: Marshallian elasticities in models with
and without savings
In Table 31 we show the Marshallian elasticities obtained when the model excludes all savings
(except student loans) and compares them to those obtained by the main model, which allows
people to save. The model is re-estimated by imposing the constraint that consumption is equal
to income in each period.
Table 31: Marshallian elasticities of labor supply - model with and without savings
Model with savings Model without savings
extensive intensive extensive intensive
All women .475 .210 .587 .254
By family composition
Single women with no children .419 .055 .304 .199
Lone mothers 1.362 .378 2.315 .374
Women in couples, no children .220 .167 .266 .200
Women in couples with children .553 .304 .641 .309
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Web Appendix F: Tax and benefit reforms
Here we provide a brief description of the UK tax and transfer system.53 We focus on reforms
between four systems – April 1995, April 1999, April 2002 and April 2004 – that represent four
different regimes in terms of the generosity and structure of taxes and transfers. These systems
are the ones we use in estimation.
Table 32 sets out the most important tax rates and thresholds for the two main personal taxes on
earnings: income tax and National Insurance. Both are individual-based and operate through a
system of tax-free allowances and income bands that are subject to different rates of tax.
Table 32: Tax rates and thresholds under different tax and transfer systems
April 1995 April 1999 April 2002 April 2004
Income tax
Personal allowance 95.45 105.87 105.97 103.09
Allowance for couples 6.99 4.81 0.00 0.00
Starting rate 20% 10% 10% 10%
Starting rate limit 86.65 36.63 44.09 43.89
Basic rate 25% 23% 22% 22%
Basic rate limit 657.99 683.83 686.6 682.21
Higher rate 40% 40% 40% 40%
National insurance
Lower earnings limit/primary threshold 81.67 83.82 106.27 102.81
Entry fee 2% 0% 0% 0%
Main rate 10% 10% 10% 11%
Upper earnings limit 619.54 634.99 698.54 689.17
Rate above upper earnings limit 0% 0% 0% 1%
Notes: Amounts expressed in weekly terms and uprated to January 2008 prices using RPI. Allowance for couples is the married
couple allowance and additional personal allowance.
Between April 1995 and April 1999, the main income tax and National Insurance reforms were as
follows. For income tax, the personal allowance and basic rate limit rose in real terms by 11% and
4% respectively. The starting rate was cut from 20% to 10% but the starting rate limit reduced
substantially (58%). Also, the basic rate was cut from 25% to 23%. For National Insurance,
the 2% ‘entry fee’ (cliff edge) payable as soon as earnings exceeded the lower earnings limit was
abolished.
Between April 1999 and April 2002, the basic rate of income tax was further reduced from 23% to
22% and the additional allowance for couples was abolished. In addition, in National Insurance, the
lower earnings limit/primary threshold and upper earnings limit rose by 27% and 10% respectively.
Between April 2002 and April 2004, the income tax personal allowance and National Insurance
53For a more comprehensive discussion of UK taxes and transfers, see Browne and Roantree (2012) and Browne
and Hood (2012).
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primary threshold both declined by 3% in real terms. Also, in National Insurance, the main rate
and the rate above upper earnings limit both rose by 1%.
The system of transfers in the UK is more complex. Most transfers are strongly contingent
on family circumstances and are means-tested at the family level. The main transfer programs
for working-age individuals in existence at some point across the four systems of interest are
as follows. Child Benefit is a universal (non-means-tested) benefit available for families with
children. Income Support (together with Income-Based Jobseeker’s Allowance) is an out-of-work
means-tested benefit that tops net family income up to a specified level based on family needs.
Children’s Tax Credit is a tax rebate available to families with children. (It actually part of the
tax system but is included here because of the way it was reformed, discussed below). Family
Credit and Working Families’ Tax Credit are means-tested benefits for working families with
children. They are structurally very similar to each other. Working Tax Credit is a means-tested
benefit for working families that is more generous for families with children but also available to
childless families. Child Tax Credit is a means-tested benefit for families with children that is not
contingent on working. Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit are subject to a joint taper.
Finally, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefits are means-tested benefits that help low-income
families meet, respectively, rent payments and council tax bills.
Table 33 sets out maximum entitlements and taper rates for transfers that were reformed across
our four systems of interest. It considers six example low-wage family types to demonstrate who
were the main gainers and losers from each reform. Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit are
not included because changes to these transfer programs were relatively minor.
Between April 1995 and April 1999, the main change was the abolition of the lone parent rate
of Child Benefit, affecting lone parents. There were also some modest increases in generosity in
Family Credit across all low-wage families with children.
Between April 1999 and April 2002, Family Credit was replaced by the considerably more generous
Working Families’ Tax Credit, affecting working families with children. The increase in generosity
was particularly large for families with childcare costs. For example, maximum entitlement for a
lone parent with one child aged 4 and no childcare costs grew by 21% compared with 93% for the
same lone parent but with childcare costs of £98.80 (38 hours at pounds 2.60 per hour). This
is because Family Credit included a childcare income disregard whereas Working Families’ Tax
Credit had a childcare element that contributed to the maximum award.
Between April 2002 and April 2004, Child Tax Credit replaced Children’s Tax Credit and child
elements of other benefits including in Working Families’ Tax Credit. This also coincided with a
modest increase in generosity. In addition, Working Tax Credit replaced Working Families’ Tax
Credit and extended entitlement to families without children.
Differences in eligibility and interactions across transfer programs make it hard to use Table 33
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Table 33: Maximum entitlements and taper rates for example families for selected benefits and
tax credits under different tax and transfer systems
April 1995 April 1999 April 2002 April 2004
Childless single
Child benefit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Income support 65.47 65.28 64.42 62.87
Children’s tax credit – – 0.00 –
Tax credits 0.00 0.00 0.00 48.02
Lone parent with one child aged 4 and no childcare costs
Child benefit 23.51 18.29 18.81 18.64
Income support 109.69 108.58 122.04 62.87
Children’s tax credit – – 12.15 –
Tax credits 93.64 96.52 117.14 162.84
Lone parent with one child aged 4 and with childcare costs
Child benefit 23.51 18.29 18.81 18.64
Income support 109.69 108.58 122.04 62.87
Children’s tax credit – – 12.15 –
Tax credits 93.64 96.52 186.30 232.00
Childless couple
Child benefit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Income support 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Children’s tax credit – – 0.00 –
Tax credits 0.00 0.00 0.00 115.69
Couple parents with one child aged 4 and no childcare costs
Child benefit 14.64 18.29 18.81 18.64
Income support 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Children’s tax credit – – 12.15 –
Tax credits 93.64 96.52 117.14 162.84
Couple parents with one child aged 4 and with childcare costs
Child benefit 14.64 18.29 18.81 18.64
Income support 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Children’s tax credit – – 12.15 –
Tax credits 93.64 96.52 186.30 232.00
Taper rates (all family types)
Income support 100% 100% 100% 100%
Children’s tax credit – – 6.67% –
Tax credits 70% 70% 55% 37%
Notes: Amounts expressed in weekly terms and uprated to January 2008 prices using RPI. Amounts ignore disability-related
supplements and transition rules. Note that it doesn’t make sense to sum across maximum entitlements for all benefits and tax
credits because some cannot be received together. April 1995 child benefit amount includes one parent benefit (later combined
with child benefit). Income support calculated assuming adults are aged 25+. Child-related components of income support became
part of tax credits in April 2004 system. Couples are not entitled to income support because the partner is assumed to be working
full-time. The children’s tax credit is an income tax rebate so is only received if income tax is paid. It became part of tax credits
in the April 2004 system. Tax credits include family credit, working families’ tax credit, working tax credit and child tax credit.
Tax credit maximum amounts calculated assuming entitlement to full-time premium and, where relevant, childcare support for 38
hours per week at 2.60 per hour. Tax credit maximum amount in April 1995 includes full-time premium that was introduced in
July 1995. The way childcare was treated for tax credits changed between the April 1999 and April 2002 systems so the maximum
tax credit awards are not directly comparable before and after these dates. Tax credits under the April 2004 system additionally
incorporate child-related support previously delivered through income support and the children’s tax credit. The 37% tax credit
taper rate in April 2004 is roughly equivalent to the 55% taper rate in April 2002 because the former operates against gross income
and the latter against net income. Also note that under the April 2004 system there was a second taper of 6.67%.
to deduce the size of the overall gain or loss across years. Therefore, Table 34 sets out the net
family income for the same six low-wage family types across the four tax and transfer systems. In
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each case, results are shown for three different hours of work: zero, part-time (18 hours per week)
and full-time (38 hours per week). In each case, the wage is assumed to be equal to the April
2004 minimum wage, uprated for inflation. In cases involving childcare costs, childcare is assumed
to be required to cover every hour of work at a rate of £2.60 per hour. A partner, if present, is
assumed to work 40 hours per week, also at the April 2004 minimum wage.
Table 34: Net income for example families under different tax and transfer systems
Hours of work April 1995 April 1999 April 2002 April 2004
Childless single
0 (not working) 65.47 65.28 64.42 62.87
18 (part-time) 85.62 86.92 87.29 86.91
38 (full-time) 148.16 152.51 154.01 167.15
Lone parent with one child aged 4 and no childcare costs
0 (not working) 109.69 108.58 122.04 128.66
18 (part-time) 184.32 181.28 201.22 213.83
38 (full-time) 227.14 223.61 263.65 266.51
Lone parent with one child aged 4 and with childcare costs
0 (not working) 109.69 108.58 122.04 128.66
18 (part-time) 191.96 190.64 236.78 249.39
38 (full-time) 267.80 275.35 332.81 337.14
Childless couple
0 (not working) 162.49 165.87 164.62 202.47
18 (part-time) 246.60 250.08 246.90 255.17
38 (full-time) 318.01 326.27 325.99 319.20
Couple parents with one child aged 4 and no childcare costs
0 (not working) 219.49 226.55 263.60 268.25
18 (part-time) 261.24 268.36 302.41 320.96
38 (full-time) 332.65 344.55 356.95 360.52
Couple parents with one child aged 4 and with childcare costs
0 (not working) 219.49 226.55 263.60 268.25
18 (part-time) 276.39 283.58 335.17 353.72
38 (full-time) 332.65 344.55 407.16 429.68
Notes: Amounts expressed in weekly terms and uprated to January 2008 prices using RPI. Amounts ignore disability-related
supplements and transition rules. Calculated assuming a wage equal to the April 2004 minimum wage uprated in line with RPI.
A partner, if present, is assumed to work 40 hours per week at the April 2004 minimum wage. Childcare costs calculated as £2.60
per hour for the number of hours worked listed in the table.
Childless singles and childless couples were largely unaffected by the reforms, except for the changes
between April 2002 and April 2004. Childless singles working full time and childless couples with
one working partner saw substantial increases in generosity (9% and 23% respectively). This was
due to the Working Tax Credit reforms, which extended entitlement to families without children.
Lone parents with no childcare costs saw the largest gains between April 1999 and April 2002,
particularly if they worked full time. This is a consequence of the Working Families Tax Credit
reform. There were smaller gains across all hours of work between April 2002 and April 2004, due
to the Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit reforms. Lone parents with childcare costs were
affected in much the same way, though many of the gains were larger. There was also an increase
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in generosity for full-time work between April 1995 and April 1999.
Turning to couple parents, the patterns are similar: the biggest gains were felt between April 1999
and April 2002, coinciding with the Working Families’ Tax Credit reform. There were also gains
between April 1995 and April 1999 particularly for full-time workers and between April 2002 and
April 2004 for part- and full-time workers.
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